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Dear Readers,
Guest Editorial
Giovanni Buttarelli
Police work and the administration of justice in general would 
be impossible without the exchange of personal information. 
As a member of the Italian judiciary, I can personally attest to 
this. At the same time, when applying and enforcing the law, 
judges and the police must themselves operate within the law, 
including the law of data protection.  
Until last year, there was no general EU standard on how data 
should be processed for judicial and law enforcement purposes. 
The new “Police Directive” (Directive (EU) 2016/680) now 
fills that void. Though not directly applicable, like its more 
glamorous counterpart − the GDPR, there are no loopholes in 
its provisions. The choice of a directive rather than a regulation 
reflects the special responsibility that remains at the national 
level for law and order and national security. The commitment 
of Member States to putting these safeguards into practice is an 
ongoing concern. The deadline for transposition of the Direc-
tive was 9 May 2018, i.e. two years after adoption. But (at the 
time of writing) only 15 Member States have transposed it. 
Member States tend to respond to appalling − but thankfully 
infrequent and isolated − incidents like the attacks in Stras-
bourg on December 2018 with calls for new EU-wide security 
measures. The 2016 PNR Directive was one such measure. Yet, 
as with the Police Directive, the deadline for transposition of 
PNR passed in May 2018, with a mere three Member States 
having fully transposed the Directive into national law. The 
Commission was obliged to reprimand 14 Member States that 
had failed to communicate the adoption of national legislation. 
It should not be necessary for the Commission to expend scarce 
resources in infringement proceedings. Failure to meet legisla-
tive commitments damages the credibility of those who have 
called so vocally for urgent EU action. 
Crime is a stigma – it signifies actions that are, by their nature, 
intended to harm individuals or society generally. Civilised so-
cieties rightly aim to prevent crime and hold accountable those 
found guilty of having committed criminal acts, including the 
most heinous, such as terrorism. By contrast, the movement 
or migration of individuals and families, sometimes of entire 
communities, for a multitude of unique reasons, is a recurring 
fact and facet of human history. Migration has never been a 
crime in a free and democratic society. 
Over the last few years, how-
ever, we have witnessed a 
growing tendency to conflate 
crime – an undisputed social 
ill – with the movement of 
people, which is innate to 
human freedom. This is why 
granting the police routine 
access to migration data-
bases and creating new IT 
systems with dual purposes 
call into question the rule of 
law in a free and democratic 
society − because all of us 
may at some point wish or be 
forced to move across bor-
ders. I fear that calls for “interoperability” – while potentially 
justifiable – are part of this trend. New IT systems with dual 
purposes are under construction, and the competencies of EU 
agencies in the ex-third pillar sphere are being extended. Once 
large-scale data systems are connected, they cannot be uncon-
nected. These are not merely technical choices; they are politi-
cal choices, with ramifications for tens of thousands of people 
for generations to come.
Europe’s challenge today is to respond to the popular calls for 
stricter controls on movement across external borders with-
out stigmatising and criminalising the people crossing those 
borders. Furthermore, where technology is involved – whether 
shared databases or the scanning of biometric information, 
which is among the most intimate data pertaining to an indi-
vidual – the EU needs to exercise extreme vigilance to ensure 
that individual dignity is not degraded. This is especially true 
given that, in our increasingly volatile and unequal world, the 
most vulnerable people tend to be the ones most often subject-
ed to monitoring and coercion enabled by digital technologies, 
such as big data analytics, profiling, and automated decision-
making. 
Now is the time for the EU to reflect on the resources needed 
for data protection governance of judicial and police coop-
eration in the coming years. In so doing, we must be guided 
by the ever richer and more comprehensive body of case law 
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from the European Court of Justice − such as Tele2 Sverige/
Watson (Joined Cases C 203/15 and C 698/15) and Ministerio 
Fiscal (Case C 207/16), which set parameters for lawful re-
quirements by which to retain and access subscriber, traffic, 
and location data.
This will shape the last chapter of the tripartite programme 
of data protection reform outlined by the European Commis-
sion in 2013 − first the GDPR and the Police Directive, then 
the EU institutions (see the recently adopted Regulation (EU) 
2018/1725), and lastly the former third pillar. If we are suc-
cessful, far from adding another layer of complexity to the 
existing and proposed new systems, we will have brought 
simplicity and accountability to the governance of personal 
data processing, fit for the purposes of the post-Lisbon Treaty 
Union. 
In the meantime, the lawful reach of the state into the now 
massive quantities of personal information accumulated by the 
private sector continues to be debated in national and Euro-
pean courts. In April 2019, it will have been exactly five years 
since the CJEU struck down Directive 2006/24/EC, requir-
ing the indiscriminate retention of telecommunications data. 
But a sustainable settlement has yet to be found, although the 
legality of bulk interception of communications and commu-
nications data will now be considered by Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights (the cases are the Big 
Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom and Centrum 
för rättvisa v. Sweden). 
Police and investigating magistrates must be able to access − 
and require the preservation of − information relevant to in-
vestigations and prosecutions within reasonable timescales. 
Within the EU, it should make no difference where the data is 
held. The proposed e-evidence Regulation attempts to do this, 
although we will need explanations of how this new proposal 
fits with the existing European Investigation Order, which has 
only recently been implemented and not yet evaluated. 
The EU is attempting to set internal standards, particularly in the 
context of Council of Europe discussions on a Second Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, while at the same 
time agreeing on norms with third countries, notably the U.S. in 
light of the Cloud Act. Where EU law enforcement aims to ac-
cess evidence held outside the EU by non-EU service providers, 
third countries will expect reciprocating entitlements to access 
evidence held by EU companies.
Ultimately, privacy, data protection, and freedom of expres-
sion are each at stake in the proposal currently under consid-
eration to harmonise rules for “hosting service providers” in 
order to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content through 
their services and to ensure its swift removal. Instructions 
from the competent public authority to the platforms should 
be clear and specific to avoid collateral interference with the 
rights of the vast majority of people who use these services 
and have nothing at all to do with terrorist activity.
A major challenge across the board is to ensure appropriate ac-
countability for these actions: it should be up to the judiciary, 
rather than private companies, to ensure compliance of law 
enforcement orders with fundamental rights law. Legal cer-
tainty will require the compatibility of these rules with the data 
protection framework, including rules on definitions of terms 
like “data” and “evidence,” on the rights of data subjects, and 
on data security. Moreover, mutual legal assistance and pre-
vention of terrorism should not be privatised; there needs to be 
democratic accountability for actions which affect the funda-
mental rights of individuals.
Giovanni Buttarelli, European Data Protection Supervisor
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News
Actualités / Kurzmeldungen
European Union*
Reported by Thomas Wahl (TW) and Cornelia Riehle (CR)
* If not stated otherwise, the news reported in 
the following sections cover the period 16 No-
vember – 31 December 2018.
In its reasoning, the CJEU empha-
sized that the application of the national 
legislation at issue is likely to cause seri-
ous damage to the EU legal order. The 
reason for this is that the independence 
of the Polish Supreme Court is not en-
sured until the delivery of the final judg-
ments in the infringement proceedings. 
Failure to ensure the independency of 
the Supreme Court may have several 
consequences, e.g.:
 Preliminary ruling mechanism does 
not work properly;
 Lack of authority of the Supreme 
Court over the lower Polish courts;
 Mutual trust of the EU Member States 
and their courts is undermined in the 
Polish system, which can lead to the re-
fusal of recognition and enforcement of 
judicial decisions made by Polish courts 
and, in the end, disturb the cooperation 
mechanism in the EU.
The CJEU also examined whether 
weighing up the interests involved sup-
port the granting of interim measures. 
The CJEU concluded that the EU’s gen-
eral interests in the proper working of its 
legal order predominates over Poland’s 
interest in the proper working of the Su-
preme Court, given the fact that the ap-
plication of the system before the reform 
is only maintained for a limited period. 
It should be noted that the order of 
17 December 2018 did not make final 
judgement on the substance of the ac-
tion. This will be done at a later stage. 
The order for interim measures is also 
without prejudice to the outcome of the 
main proceedings. (TW)
Area of Freedom, Security  
and Justice
CJEU Paves Way to Exit from Brexit
The United Kingdom is free to unilater-
ally revoke the notification of its inten-
tion to withdraw from the EU. Unani-
mous approval by the European Council 
regarding this revocation is not neces-
sary. This was the response of the CJEU 
plenary to a request for a preliminary 
ruling by the Scottish Court of Session 
(Case C-621/18, Wightman and Others 
v. Secretary of State for Exiting the Eu-
ropean Union).
The question of whether the notifica-
tion of the UK’s intention to withdraw 
from the EU (made in accordance with 
Art. 50 TEU) can be revoked was posed 
by members of the UK Parliament, the 
Scottish Parliament, and the European 
Parliament. The intention was to provide 
guidance to the members of the House 
of Commons when exercising their vote 
on the withdrawal agreement. 
With the  CJEU’s answer of 10 De-
cember 2018, the UK now has three 
(instead of two) options since the pro-
Foundations
Fundamental Rights
CJEU Confirms Interim Measures 
Against Polish Supreme Court Reform
Also after having heard the arguments 
of the Polish government, the CJEU 
confirmed interim measures against the 
reform of the retirement age of Supreme 
Court judges under new Polish law. By 
order of 17 December 2018, the judges 
in Luxembourg granted the Commis-
sion’s request for interim measures and 
upheld a provisional order of 19 October 
2018 by the Vice-President of the Court 
(see eucrim 3/2018, 144). The full text 
of the order (referred to as Case C-619/ 
18 R) is available in French. 
Despite taking into account the posi-
tion of the Polish government, the CJEU 
acknowledged that the pleas raised by 
the Commission were justified in fact 
and law. All requirements for interim 
relief were fulfilled, in particular the ur-
gency requirement, which presupposes 
that the interlocutory order avoids seri-
ous and irreparable harm to the interests 
of the EU. 
NEWS – EUROPEAN UNION
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cedure of Art. 50 TEU was triggered by 
the British Prime Minister’s notification 
to leave the EU following the Brexit ref-
erendum on 23 June 2016:
 Withdrawal from the EU without an 
agreement;
 Withdrawal from the EU with an 
agreement;
 Revocation of the notification of the 
intention to withdraw, with the UK re-
maining in the EU.
The judges in Luxembourg stressed, 
however, that the revocation is subject to 
the national constitutional requirements. 
Furthermore, a revocation is subject to 
the following:
 Only possible as long as a withdrawal 
agreement between the EU and the UK 
has not entered into force, or, if no agree-
ment is concluded, as long as the two-
year period (or any possible extension) 
from the date of the notification of the 
intention to withdraw has not expired;
 The revocation is unequivocal and 
unconditional;
 The revocation must be communicat-
ed in writing to the European Council.
A revocation would have the effect 
that the UK remains in the EU under the 
terms of its current status and that the 
withdrawal procedure is put to an end.
In its reasoning, the CJEU observed 
that the revocation is not expressly gov-
erned by Art. 50 TEU, but follows the 
same rules as the withdrawal itself. Con-
sequently, the EU Member State that no-
tifies its intention to withdraw can uni-
laterally decide not to do so, because it is 
the sovereign decision to retain a status 
as a EU Member State. 
An approval of the revocation by the 
other EU Member States (as put forward 
by the Council and the Commission in 
the proceedings) would be counter to the 
principle that a Member State cannot be 
forced to leave the EU against its will. 
The judgment of the CJEU extends 
the spectrum of action for UK parlia-
mentarians and can be termed “inte-
gration-friendly.” It remains rather un-
likely, however, that the option of the 
revocation will be heeded. First, the 
UK must overcome the current political 
impasse. (TW)
Schengen
New Legal Framework for Schengen 
Information System
spot
light
New alerts on criminals and re-
turn decisions; greater vigilance 
for terrorist offences; better pro-
tection for children at risk of abduction; 
and enhanced data protection. These are 
the main features of the new legal frame-
work for the EU’s largest security data-
base, the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). The new rules aim at better effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the system’s 
second generation (SIS II), whose legal 
bases stem from 2006/2007 and which 
became fully operational in 2013. 
The reform proposal presented by 
the Commission on 21 December 2016 
(see eucrim 1/2017, p. 7) was adopted 
in November 2018 by the Council. The 
European Parliament had already agreed 
to the political compromise found dur-
ing the trilogue negotiations in October 
2018.  
The new legal framework was pub-
lished on 7 December 2018 in the Offi-
cial Journal (O.J. L 312). It consists of 
three regulations:
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 on the 
use of the Schengen Information System 
for the return of illegally staying third-
country nationals; 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the 
SIS in the field of border checks;
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the 
SIS in the field of police cooperation and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
amending and repealing Council Deci-
sion 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Reg-
ulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Decision 2010/261/EU.
The three legal instruments were con-
sidered necessary because of the distinct 
EU Member States’ participation in EU 
policies in the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice. The regulations empha-
sise, however, that this separation does 
not affect the principle that SIS consti-
tutes one single information system that 
should operate as such.
In general, the new rules pursue the 
following objectives:
 Ensuring a high level of security;
 Increasing the efficiency of the SIS;
 Protecting the free movement of per-
sons from abuse;
 Improving the exchange of informa-
tion;
 Making the SIS a central tool for 
fighting terrorism and serious crime;
 Supporting border and migration 
management;
 Preparing the SIS for its interopera-
bility with other large-scale EU informa-
tion systems, such as the VIS, Eurodac, 
ETIAS, and EES.
The SIS continues to cover three ar-
eas of competence: 
 Security cooperation, allowing police 
and judicial authorities to establish and 
consult alerts on persons or stolen ob-
jects in relation to criminal offences;
 Border and migration management, 
enabling border and migration authori-
ties to control the legality of third-coun-
try nationals’ stays in the Schengen area;
 Vehicle control, granting vehicle reg-
istration authorities access to informa-
tion about vehicles, number plates, or 
vehicle registration documents in order 
to check the legal status of vehicles.
The following gives an overview 
of the new features of the legislation, 
in particular as regards Regulation 
2018/1862 on the operation and use of 
the SIS for police and judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters:
New Alerts:
 Introduction of a new alert category 
of “unknown wanted persons” con-
nected to a serious crime, e.g., persons 
whose fingerprints are found on a weap-
on used in a crime;
 Extension of the existing category of 
“missing persons” to “vulnerable per-
sons who need to be prevented from 
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travelling,” e.g., children at high risk of 
parental abduction, children at risk of 
becoming victims of trafficking in hu-
man beings, and children at risk of being 
recruited as foreign terrorist fighters;
 Creation of the new category “inquiry 
check” allowing national law enforce-
ment authorities to stop and interview 
a person in order for the issuing Mem-
ber State to obtain detailed information;
 Introduction of the category of “ob-
jects of high value,” e.g., items of in-
formation technology, which can be 
identified and searched with a unique 
identification number.
Greater Vigilance over Terrorist 
Offences:
 Obligation for Member States to cre-
ate SIS alerts for cases related to terror-
ist offences;
 Obligation to inform Europol of hits 
alerts linked to terrorism in order to help 
to “connect the dots” of terrorism at the 
European level.
Types of Data – Use of Biometrics:
 New rules on more effective use of 
existing biometric identifiers, i.e., facial 
images, fingerprints, palm prints, and 
DNA profiles;
 Use of facial images for biometric 
identification;
 Use of DNA profiles when search-
ing for missing persons who need to be 
placed under protection;
Law Enforcement Access:
 Immigration authorities allowed to 
consult SIS in relation to irregular mi-
grants who were not checked at a regular 
border control;
 SIS granted access to boat and air-
craft registration authorities; 
 SIS granted access to services respon-
sible for registering firearms in order to 
allow them to verify whether the firearm 
is being sought for seizure in Mem-
ber States or whether there is an alert on 
the person requesting the registration;
 Europol’s access rights extended to 
give it full access to the system, includ-
ing missing persons, return alerts, and 
alerts in relation to third-country na-
tionals;
 European Borders and Coast Guard 
Agency and its teams granted access 
to all SIS categories, insofar as it is 
necessary for the performance of their 
tasks and as required by the opera-
tional plan for a specific border guard 
operation.
Enhanced Data Protection and Data 
Security:
 Introduction of additional safeguards 
to ensure that the collection and process-
ing of, and access to, data is limited to 
what is strictly necessary and operation-
ally required;
 Applicability of and adaptation to the 
new EU data protection framework, in 
particular Directive 2016/680 and the 
GDPR;
 Coordination and end-to-end supervi-
sion by the national data protection au-
thorities and the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor.
Regulation 2018/1860 establishes an 
effective system, so that return decisions 
issued in respect of third-country na-
tionals staying illegally on the territory 
of the Member States can be better en-
forced and third-country nationals sub-
ject to those decisions can be monitored. 
Regulation 2018/1861 establishes the 
conditions and procedures for the entry 
and processing of SIS alerts on third-
country nationals and for the exchange 
of supplementary information/addition-
al data for the purpose of refusing entry 
into/stay on the territory of the Member 
States. Member States will, inter alia, be 
obliged to insert into the SIS any entry 
bans issued to third-country nationals 
preventing them from entering into the 
Schengen area.
The regulations contain specific rules 
as regards the EU Member States hav-
ing a special status with Schengen and 
measures in the area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice of the TFEU, e.g., Den-
mark, Ireland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, and Cyprus.
As regards the entry into force of the 
new SIS rules, the regulations follow a 
step-by-step approach: Several improve-
ments to the system apply immediately 
upon entry into force of Regulations 
2018/1861 and 2018/1862 (i.e., 27 De-
cember 2018), whereas others will apply 
either one or two years after entry into 
force. The said regulations should apply 
in their entirety within three years after 
entry into force − and by 28 December 
2021 at the latest. Regulation 2018/1860 
will apply from the date set by the Com-
mission. 
The SIS is the most widely used secu-
rity database in Europe, with over 5 bil-
lion consultations in 2017 and currently 
contains around 79 million records. It is 
estimated that further enhancement of 
the SIS by the new legal framework will 
cost the EU around €65 million by 2020. 
Each EU Member State will reportedly 
receive a lump sum of €1.2 million to 
upgrade its national system. The EU 
agency eu-LISA will be responsible for 
technical improvements and operation 
of the system. (TW) 
EP Wants Temporary Border Controls 
Kept to a Minimum
On 29 November 2018, the European 
Parliament (EP) adopted its negotiating 
position on the revision of the Schengen 
Borders Code. MEPs backed amend-
ments as proposed by rapporteur Tanja 
Fajon (S&D, Slovenia) by 319 to 241 
votes (with 78 abstentions). 
The reform was initiated by the Com-
mission in September 2017 (see eucrim 
3/2017, pp. 98–99) and aims at adapting 
rules on the temporary reintroduction 
of internal border controls in a targeted 
manner. 
MEPs stressed that the revision must 
ensure the Schengen achievements and 
put an end to current misuse or misinter-
pretation when upholding internal bor-
der controls. 
In particular, the EP advocated reduc-
ing the time periods by means of which 
internal borders controls can be upheld 
as follows:
 The initial period for border checks 
should be limited to two months; 
 Border checks should not be extend-
ed beyond one year.
NEWS – EUROPEAN UNION
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Furthermore, the EP’s amendments to 
the proposal highlighted the following:
 Temporary border checks should only 
be used in exceptional circumstances 
and as a measure of last resort;
 Schengen countries should provide 
a detailed risk assessment if temporary 
border checks are extended beyond the 
initial two months;
 Subsequent extensions of border 
checks beyond six months require the 
Commission to state whether or not the 
prolongation follows the legal require-
ments and should be authorised by the 
EU Council of Ministers;. 
 The EP must be more informed and 
involved in the process.
Representatives of the EP will now 
enter into negotiations with the Council, 
which adopted its approach to the Schen-
gen Borders Code reform in June 2018. 
Currently, five Schengen countries 
(Austria, Germany, Denmark, Swe-
den, and Norway) have internal border 
checks in place due to exceptional cir-
cumstances resulting from the migratory 
crisis that started in 2015. France carries 
out internal border checks due to a per-
sistent terrorist threat.
The EP previously voiced criticism 
over the prolongation of internal border 
controls, which is not in line with the ex-
isting rules, unnecessary, and dispropor-
tional (see eucrim 2/2018, p. 84). (TW)
Institutions
Council
Romania Kicks off New Trio Presidency 
of the Council of the EU
Under the motto “Cohesion, a common 
European value,” Romania took over the 
Presidency of the Council of the EU on 
1 January 2019. Priorities of the Roma-
nian Presidency in the area of security 
include:
 Increasing the interoperability of EU 
security systems;
 Protecting the safety of citizens, com-
panies, and public institutions in the cy-
berspace;
 Improving the overall resilience of 
the Union to cyber-attacks;
 Continuing the fight against terrorism;
 Setting up the European Public Pros-
ecutor’s Office.
The Romanian Presidency is the first 
in a new 18-month Trio Presidency, to 
be followed by Finland (July–December 
2019) and Croatia (January–June 2020). 
According to the Trio Presidency’s 
18-month programme, priorities for the 
EU’s internal security are:
 To enhance police and judicial coop-
eration;
 To combat organised crime, including 
drug trafficking and human trafficking;
 To remove terrorist content online 
and to prevent radicalisation and ex-
tremism;
 To enhance the interoperability of in-
formation systems;
 To further develop the capacities 
needed to promote cybersecurity and to 
counter cyberrisks;
 To advance mutual recognition and 
commit to promote e-Evidence and e-
Justice;
 To establish the EPPO and strengthen 
cooperation with OLAF. 
The Trio programme points out that, 
at the beginning of the Trio, the main 
priority will be the finalisation of the still 
outstanding files of the current Strategic 
Agenda and in particular those listed in 
the Joint Declaration on the EU‘s legis-
lative priorities for 2018–19. The future 
work will also be inspired by the out-
come of the EU summit in Sibiu, Roma-
nia, which takes place on 9 May 2019, 
Europe Day. It will be the first summit 
of the national leaders of the EU-27 after 
Brexit. (CR)
OLAF
ECA: Planned OLAF Reform Still Has 
Weaknesses
On 22 November 2018, the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) issued Opinion 
No 8/2018 on the Commission’s pro-
posal of 23 May 2018 amending OLAF 
Regulation 883/2013 (for the proposal, 
see eucrim 1/2018, pp. 5–6). The ECA 
observes that the proposal pursues two 
objectives: (1) to adapt the functioning 
of OLAF to the establishment of the 
EPPO; (2) to enhance the effectiveness 
of OLAF’s investigative function. The 
ECA Opinion welcomes certain ap-
proaches and concepts in the Commis-
sion proposal, but still sees some weak-
nesses preventing the two objectives 
from being met.
Regarding the relationship with the 
EPPO, the ECA points out the follow-
ing:
 There is a risk that evidence collected 
by OLAF at the EPPO’s request would 
not be admissible before national courts 
if OLAF applies its own procedural 
safeguards but not the ones laid down in 
the EPPO Regulation;
 The proposal does not address 
OLAF’s role in criminal investigations 
affecting the EU’s financial interests, if 
they concern both Member States that 
participate in the EPPO scheme and 
those that do not;
 The effectiveness of “complementary 
investigations” on the part of OLAF is 
not ensured.
Regarding the second objective – en-
hancing the effectiveness of OLAF’s 
investigative function – the ECA wel-
comed the targeted measures, but does 
not consider the overall issues surround-
ing the effectiveness of OLAF’s admin-
istrative investigations resolved. The 
ECA makes specific recommendations 
for the legislative proposal, e.g., bring-
ing OLAF reports under review by the 
CJEU.
Ultimately, the auditors stress the 
need to further action. In the short term, 
the Commission should address the 
overall issues of OLAF’s effectiveness, 
and the Commission should reconsider 
OLAF’s role in combating EU fraud. 
Hence, OLAF must be given a strategic 
and oversight role in EU anti-fraud ac-
tions. 
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In the medium term, the Commission 
should evaluate the cooperation between 
OLAF and the EPPO. This should cover:
 Possible restructuring of the EU bod-
ies in charge of administrative and crim-
inal investigations;
 Possible single legal framework to 
combat fraud in EU spending.
The ECA Opinion is not binding for 
the co-legislators (Council and EP), but 
is designed to support their work. (TW)
OAFCN Meeting at OLAF
In November 2018, OLAF hosted the 
annual meeting of the Anti-Fraud Com-
municators’ Network (OAFCN). Com-
munication experts working for anti-
fraud public organisations discussed 
crisis communication, the importance 
of storytelling, and real-life communica-
tion scenarios.
The OAFCN is a European-wide 
network of communication officers and 
spokespersons from OLAF‘s operation-
al partners in the Member States, such as 
customs, police, law enforcement agen-
cies, prosecutors’ offices, and Member 
States’ Anti-Fraud Coordination Services 
(AFCOS). It is designed to communicate 
the threat of fraud and counter-measures 
to the public. It is also an important fo-
rum for awareness raising on fraud is-
sues. (TW)
European Public Prosecutor’s Office
Vacancy Notice for the European Chief 
Prosecutor 
On 19 November 2018, the European 
Commission published a call for appli-
cation for the first ever European Chief 
Prosecutor (ECP) to head the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) based 
in Luxembourg. 
The European Chief Prosecutor is the 
Head of the EPPO, in charge of organis-
ing its work, directing its activities, and 
taking decisions in accordance with the 
EPPO Regulation and its internal rules 
of procedure. Furthermore, the ECP rep-
resents the EPPO towards EU institu-
tions, EU Member States, and third par-
ties. Additionally, the ECP has various 
duties and responsibilities with regard to 
the setting up of the College, the Perma-
nent Chambers, and the EPPO’s internal 
rules of procedure and financial rules.
Interested applicants must be citizens 
of one of the EU Member States par-
ticipating in the EPPO. The candidate 
may be no more than 63 years of age at 
the time of the appointment and have a 
minimum of fifteen years of professional 
experience as an active member of the 
public prosecution service or judiciary 
and at least five years of experience as a 
public prosecutor responsible for the in-
vestigation and prosecution of financial 
crimes in a Member State. 
After evaluation of the selected can-
didates by a selection panel, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council will 
appoint the ECP. 
The vacancy notice was open until 
14 December 2018. (CR)
Europol
Cooperation Europol-Japan on New 
Footing
On 3 December 2018, Europol and the 
National Police Agency of Japan (NPA) 
signed a Working Arrangement with the 
aim of combating serious, international 
cross-border, and organised crime such 
as terrorism, drug trafficking, and cyber-
crime. Under the arrangement, a secure 
communication line will be established 
between the agencies. Furthermore, the 
NPA may second a liaison officer to Eu-
ropol. In this way, a secure, timely, and 
direct exchange of information between 
Europol and the NPA will be ensured.
The arrangement comes in addition 
to the cooperation offered by the exist-
ing Agreement between Japan and the 
European Union on Mutual Legal As-
sistance in Criminal Matters. It is also 
designed to foster cooperation between 
the EU and Japan in view of the upcom-
ing Olympic Games in Tokyo in 2020. 
(CR)
Cooperation with Diebold Nixdorf
On 16 November 2018, Europol and 
Diebold Nixdorf signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the aim to 
better prevent, prosecute, and disrupt cy-
bercrime related to self-service ecosys-
tems.  Under the MoU, Diebold Nixdorf 
will be able to share threat intelligence 
data and best practices with Europol in a 
secure and trusted manner. 
Diebold Nixdorf Inc is a global end-
to-end provider of electronic services, 
software, and hardware (e.g., for self-
service transaction systems such as 
ATMs and point-of-sale technology) for 
the financial and retail industries. (CR)
Second Annual Conference on Drugs  
in Europe
On 6–7 December 2018, Europol hosted 
the second annual conference on “Drugs 
in Europe: a bold law enforcement re-
sponse.” Delegates from all over the EU, 
third states, and international organisa-
tions discussed the latest developments 
in illicit drug trafficking.
Faced with an increasing number of 
organised criminal groups and the sup-
ply of illegal drugs, delegates called on 
Member States to ensure adequate re-
sources to combat them. Furthermore, 
emphasis was placed on the need for a 
coordinated response between the EU 
and Member States as well as the ex-
change of information, operational co-
operation, and coordination of activities 
between Member States’ law enforce-
ment authorities and Europol. Lastly, 
delegates underlined the need for effec-
tive implementation of comprehensive 
asset recovery legislation. (CR)
Operational Network Against Mafia-
Style Criminal Groups
At the end of November 2018, law en-
forcement authorities from Italy, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Spain kicked off a new operational 
network (@ON), together with Europol, 
to strengthen their cooperation against 
mafia-style criminal groups, Eurasian 
and Albanian criminal networks, and 
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stitutions. Furthermore, over 300 banks 
supported the action.
In addition, a money muling aware-
ness raising campaign was kicked off 
on 4 December 2018. Information is 
provided under #DontBeAMule on how 
these criminals operate, how one can 
protect oneself, and what to do if one be-
comes a victim. 
Money mules are persons who, often 
unwittingly, transfer illegally obtained 
money between different accounts on 
behalf of others. They are regularly 
tricked by criminal organisations that 
promise easy money. (CR)
Eurojust
New Eurojust Regulation 
spot
light
On 6 November 2018, after 5 
years of discussion, Eurojust’s 
new Regulation was adopted 
with the aim of strengthening its capa-
bilities to support the national authori-
ties in their fight against serious, cross-
border crime. The Regulation ((EU) 
2018/1727) was published in the Official 
Journal L 295 of 21 November 2018, 
p. 138.
In the Regulation, Eurojust’s compe-
tences are now clearly set out without 
referring to the Europol Convention (as 
the previous Eurojust Decision did). The 
forms of serious crime for which Euro-
just is competent are now listed in an An-
nex I to the Regulation. The Regulation 
also defines the categories of related of-
fences for which Eurojust is competent. 
It also outlines that, in general, Eurojust 
shall not exercise its competence with 
regard to crimes for which the EPPO 
exercises its competence. The practical 
details of Eurojust’s exercise of compe-
tence, however, shall be governed by an 
additional working arrangement. Ulti-
mately, when requested by a competent 
authority of a Member State, Eurojust 
may also assist with investigations and 
prosecutions for forms of crime other 
than those listed in Annex I. 
While the distinction is still made as 
Conference on the Implementation of the EPPO Regulation
Bucharest, 13-14 December 2018
The Romanian National Anti-Corruption Directorate (with the assistance of the Roma-
nian Association for the Research of EU Criminal Law) organised the conference “The 
impact of the EPPO Regulation at the level of the national authorities of the participat-
ing EU Member States.” The HERCULE III Programme financially supported the con-
ference. It was part of the ongoing project “Promoting the protection of the financial 
interests of the EU by supporting the actions of the Member States and the European 
Institutions in the transition towards the EPPO.”
The event brought together representatives from the national prosecution offices, 
judges, academics, and members of the Associations for European Criminal Law and 
the Protection of Financial Interests of the European Union. It aimed to facilitate the 
sharing of experiences, challenges, and practices in order to prepare the EU and the 
national legal systems for the establishment of the EPPO.
The first part of the conference included presentations on the state of play of the 
implementation of the EPPO Regulation (Péter József Csonka, DG JUST), on OLAF 
support in EPPO investigation (Luca de Matteis, OLAF) and on the challenges of the 
implementation of the PIF Directive (Christoph Burchard, University of Frankfurt). The 
conference continued with presentations that focused on the study on the impact of 
the future EPPO on the Romanian judicial and legal system (Gheorge Bocsan, Pros-
ecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation, Romania), on the relations 
between the national and European Prosecutors (Alberto Perduca, Chief Prosecutor, 
Italy) and on the reporting obligations and general cooperation between the national 
authorities and the EPPO (Emanuelle Wachenheim, Ministry of Justice, France). 
Additional presentations addressed the issues of admissibility and freedom of circula-
tion of evidence during the investigation and adjudication of the EPPO cases (John 
Vervaele, Utrecht University), cross-border investigations, cooperation within the 
EPPO and MLA in criminal matters with third countries (Filippo Spiezia, Vice-President 
of Eurojust), and the procedural guarantees and protection of human rights during 
EPPO investigations (Miguel Carmona, magistrate, Spain).
The last part of the conference was dedicated to a hypothetical case study (Alexandra 
Lancranjan, DNA, Romania), which was subsequently discussed in detail by the par-
ticipants in different working groups.
Dr. András Csúri, University of Utrecht
  Report
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. Within the 
network, specialised investigative units 
and special investigators will offer sup-
port to the Member States involved.
The ONNET project is financially 
supported by the European Commission. 
@ON is composed of the Italian Di-
rezione Investigativa Antimafia (D.I.A.) 
– which plays a leading role – the Bel-
gian Federal Police, the French National 
Police and Gendarmerie Nationale, the 
German Federal Criminal Police Office 
(Bundeskriminalamt), the Dutch Na-
tional Police, and the Spanish National 
Police and Guardia Civil. (CR)
Fourth European Money Mule Action 
Europol, Eurojust, and the European 
Banking Federation (EBF) reported on 
the fourth European Money Mule Action 
“EMMA 4” – a global law enforcement 
action week tackling the issue of money 
muling. According to the joint press re-
lease of 4 December 2018, the action led 
to the arrest of 140 money mule organis-
ers and 168 persons. In addition, 1504 
money mules were identified (for previ-
ous actions, see eucrim 1/2016, p. 6). 
Thirty states took part in the action 
that ran from September to November 
2018, together with the European in-
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to whether Eurojust exercises its func-
tion as a college or through its National 
Members, Eurojust’s operational func-
tions are now clearly set out under Art. 4. 
Regarding the National Members, the 
Regulation now requests the Member 
States to grant them at least the powers 
referred to in this Regulation in order for 
them to be able to fulfil their tasks. Con-
trary to the former Eurojust Decision, 
the Regulation now limits the length of 
the term of office of the National Mem-
bers to 5 years, renewable once. The 
Regulation now describes the powers of 
the National Members in detail as well 
as the types of national registers they 
shall have access to. 
The College’s voting rules for taking 
decisions changed from a two-thirds ma-
jority to a majority of its members. Fur-
thermore, under the Regulation, the Col-
lege has now been asked to adopt annual 
and multi-annual work programmes set-
ting out objectives and strategic aims for 
their work. In addition, the new Regu-
lation introduces an Executive Board to 
deal with administrative matters in order 
to allow Eurojust’s College to focus on 
operational issues. A representative of 
the European Commission will be part 
of the Executive Board. 
Contrary to the former Eurojust De-
cision, roles and tasks of Eurojust’s Na-
tional Coordination System and national 
correspondents are laid out in the Regu-
lation. The exchange of information 
with the Member States and between 
national members is also set out in more 
detail, requiring the competent national 
authorities to inform their national mem-
bers without undue delay under certain 
conditions. 
More democratic oversight is fore-
seen by means of regular reporting to 
the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. 
Finally, Eurojust’s data protection 
rules have been aligned with the latest 
EU data protection rules, including su-
pervision by the EDPS.
Eurojust’s reform through the new 
Regulation is the last in a series of re-
forms, with new Regulations for Frontex 
entering into force in 2016 and Europol 
entering into force in 2017, and the crea-
tion of the EPPO. The Regulation re-
places and repeals Council Decision 
2002/187/JHA. It will be applicable by 
the end of 2019. (CR) 
First Liaison Prosecutor for Macedonia 
On 12 November 2018, Ms Lenche Ris-
toska took up her duties as the first Liai-
son Prosecutor for the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia at Eurojust. 
Before her secondment to Eurojust, Ms 
Ristoska served as a prosecutor at the 
Special Public Prosecutors’ Office in 
Skopje. She also previously worked for 
the Department for International Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of 
the Primary Public Prosecutor’s Office 
of Skopje, executing incoming mutual 
legal assistance (MLA) requests as well 
as in the Department for Drugs, Sexual 
and Violent Crimes. 
The appointment of liaison prosecu-
tors is foreseen in the cooperation agree-
ment between Eurojust and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which 
was concluded in 2008. Liaison prose-
cutors play an important role in facili-
tating ongoing investigations of serious, 
cross-border, organised crime, given 
the increased number of cases that have 
connection with the Western Balkans. 
The appointment of liaison prosecu-
tors from Western Balkan states at Eu-
rojust is also part of Eurojust’s efforts to 
build up structural, judicial cooperation 
in the region in the fight against serious, 
cross-border crime. More information 
on Eurojust’s cooperation with the West-
ern Balkans is available at the Eurojust 
website. (CR)
Frontex
FRA Opinion on Revised Frontex 
Regulation
At the end of November 2018, FRA 
published its Opinion on the revised Eu-
ropean Border and Coast Guard Regula-
tion and its fundamental rights implica-
tions.
In the Opinion, FRA focuses on four 
issues and makes suggestions on the fol-
lowing:
 How to strengthen Frontex’ overall 
fundamental rights protection frame-
work;
 How to address fundamental rights 
risks in specific aspects of Frontex op-
eration;
 The Agency’s activities in the return 
of third-country nationals;
 Challenges related to the enhanced 
role of Frontex in third countries.  
The opinion does not cover issues 
such as the deployments of liaison offic-
ers and their role with regard to respect 
for fundamental rights or cover ques-
tions of criminal liability of deployed 
team members. (CR)
Risk Analysis Cell in Niger
In cooperation with Nigerian authorities, 
Frontex opened the first Risk Analysis 
Cell in Niamey, Niger at the end of No-
vember 2018. The cell will collect and 
analyse strategic data on cross-border 
crime such as illegal border crossings, 
document fraud, and trafficking in hu-
man beings. It will support relevant au-
thorities involved in border management 
to produce analysis and policy recom-
mendations. It is run by local analysts 
trained by Frontex.
The Risk Analysis Cell in Niger is 
the first of eight such cells that will be 
established within the framework of the 
Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community 
(AFIC). Over the next twelve months, 
these cells will be set up in Ghana, Gam-
bia, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea, 
and Mali. (CR)
Eastern Partnership IBM Project 
Concluded 
At the end of November 2018, after 
four years, the Eastern Partnership 
Integrated Border Management (EaP 
IBM) Capacity Building Project was 
concluded with a final meeting at Fron-
tex premises. By offering technical as-
NEWS – EUROPEAN UNION
198 |  eucrim   4 / 2018
sistance through Frontex, the project 
aimed at expanding the ability of par-
ticipating border agencies to effectively 
implement the Integrated Border Man-
agement concept. A training system on 
Integrated Border Management was es-
tablished through the project. Countries 
that participated included Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldo-
va, and Ukraine. (CR)
Specific Areas of Crime /  
Substantive Criminal Law
Protection of Financial Interests 
New Action Plan Against Illicit 
Tobacco Trade
On 7 December 2018, the Commission 
published the 2nd Action Plan to fight 
the illicit tobacco trade (Communica-
tion to the European Parliament and the 
Council, COM(2018) 846 final). The ac-
tion plan covers the period 2018–2020. 
The Commission stresses that the illicit 
tobacco trade can only be curbed by a 
combination of policy and enforcement 
measures.
It builds on the 1st Action Plan of 
2013, its evaluation in 2017, and the 
WHO Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade 
in Tobacco Products (FCTC Protocol). 
The FCTC Protocol was actively ne-
gotiated by the European Commission 
and entered into force on 25 September 
2018.
According to the new plan envisaged 
by the Commission in the years to come, 
the following should be pursued:
 Fully exploiting the new FCTC Pro-
tocol’s potential as a global instrument 
and forum to curb the illicit tobacco 
trade; 
 Engaging key source and transit 
countries via various frameworks for co-
operation;
 Focusing on some of the key input 
materials going into the illicit manu-
facture of tobacco products, ranging 
from raw tobacco and cigarette filters 
to manufacturing and packing equip-
ment; 
 Raising consumer awareness of the 
dangers of buying illicit tobacco prod-
ucts and of the direct links to organised 
crime as a means of reducing demand;
 Continuing to invest in intelligence 
gathering and analysis as a basis for 
effective targeting of policy and opera-
tional measures.
A concrete list of actions is contained 
in an Annex to the Communication.
The illicit tobacco trade is estimated 
to cause an annual €10 billion loss in 
public revenue in the EU and its Mem-
ber States. (TW)
ECA Opinion on Future Anti-Fraud 
Programme
On 15 November 2018, the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) adopted Opin-
ion No 9/2018 on the Commission’s 
proposal for a Regulation establishing 
the EU Anti-Fraud Programme for the 
2021-2027 financing period (for the pro-
posal, see eucrim 2/2018, pp. 92–93). 
The successor to the current Hercule 
III-Programme, which expires in 2020, 
aims at protecting the EU’s financial in-
terests and supporting mutual assistance 
between the administrative authorities 
of the Member States. It also aims at 
cooperation between the Member States 
and the Commission to ensure the cor-
rect application of the law on customs 
and agriculture.
The ECA recommends the following:
 Better specification of the pro-
gramme’s concrete objectives and indi-
cators to evaluate its results;
 Clarification of the frequency of per-
formance and introduction of independ-
ent evaluators to carry out evaluations;
 Improved evaluations by the Com-
mission of the programme’s added value 
and assessment of possible overlaps 
with other EU actions.
If the plans of the Commission are 
supported by the co-legislators (Coun-
cil and EP), the new programme would 
have €181 million at its disposal for the 
entire period. (TW)
Money Laundering
Council: Anti-Money Laundering  
Action Plan
At its meeting of 4 December 2018, the 
ECOFIN Council adopted conclusions 
on an Anti-Money Laundering Action 
Plan. The ministers welcomed the pro-
gress made in preventing and combat-
ing money laundering in recent years, 
but call for further improvements, in 
particular as regards the (cross-border) 
exchange of information and collabora-
tion between prudential and anti-money 
laundering supervisory authorities.
The action plan includes eight ob-
jectives that should be addressed in the 
short term:
 Identifying the factors that contribut-
ed to the recent money laundering cases 
in EU banks; 
 Mapping relevant money laundering 
and terrorist financing risks and the best 
prudential supervisory practices to ad-
dress them; 
 Enhancing supervisory convergence; 
 Ensuring effective cooperation be-
tween prudential and money laundering 
supervisors; 
 Clarifying aspects related to the with-
drawal of a bank’s authorisation in case 
of serious breaches; 
 Improving supervision and exchange 
of information between relevant authori-
ties; 
 Sharing best practices and identifying 
grounds for convergence among nation-
al authorities; 
 Improving the European supervisory 
authorities’ capacity to make better use 
of existing powers and tools.
The latter refers to the recent Com-
mission proposal of 12 September 2018, 
which aims at amending existing EU 
rules on the supervision of banks and 
financial institutions (cf. eucrim 2/2018, 
p. 94). This proposal is currently under 
discussion in the Council. 
An annex lists the concrete actions 
planned. As from June 2019, the Com-
mission is requested to report back on the 
progress made in the implementation of 
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the Action Plan detailed in the Annex of 
the Conclusions every six months. (TW)
Cybercrime
12th Referral Action Day 
On 20 November 2018, Europol’s EU 
Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) organ-
ised a joint Referral Action Day together 
with national referral units from seven 
Member States and third parties, target-
ing online material linked to terrorist 
activities. This time, 7393 items were 
assessed and referred to participating 
online platforms, requesting their re-
view. (CR)
First European Youth Day 
Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3) organised a European Youth Day 
for the first time, which took place on 
20 November 2018. Under the slogan 
“Digital Rights of Youth against Vio-
lence,” approx. 100 youths between 12 
and 15 years of age gathered at Europol 
to discuss online and offline safety is-
sues. As a result, a call for action was 
drafted, calling on Internet governance 
institutions, Internet providers, policy-
makers, and all relevant stakeholders to 
create a safer Internet for children and 
adolescents. (CR) 
Terrorism
EP Tables Recommendations for New 
EU Strategy to Combat Terrorism
On 12 December 2018, MEPs adopted 
a resolution that contains over 225 rec-
ommendations for tackling the threat of 
terrorism. The resolution goes back to a 
report from MEPs Monica Hohlmeier 
(EPP, Germany), and Helga Stevens 
(ECR, Belgium), who compiled the find-
ings of the Special Committee on Terror-
ism (TERR). 
The Special Committee was estab-
lished in 2017 following the persistent 
terrorist threats that the EU has had to 
face in recent years. The Committee was 
mandated with examining, analysing, 
and assessing the extent of the terrorist 
threat on European soil. It carried out 
a thorough assessment of the existing 
forces on the ground in order to enable 
the EU and its Member States to step 
up their capacity to prevent, investigate, 
and prosecute terrorist offences. 
The resolution of December 2018 
makes recommendations in the follow-
ing areas:
 Institutional framework;
 Terrorist threat;
 Prevention and countering of radi-
calisation leading to violent extremism;
 Cooperation and information ex-
change;
 External borders;
 Terrorist financing;
 Critical infrastructure protection;
 Explosive precursors;
 Illicit weapons;
 External dimension;
 Victims of terrorism;
 Fundamental rights.
The EP requests, inter alia, that the 
role of Europol and the EU agency for 
the operational management of large-
scale IT systems (eu-LISA) be rein-
forced. Furthermore, improvements in 
information exchange and cooperation 
between intelligence services and au-
thorities are necessary. Other proposals 
include:
 EU watch list for hate preachers;
 Allowing the police to cross-check 
persons renting cars against police da-
tabases;
 Anti-radicalisation measures, includ-
ing programmes for prisons, education, 
and campaigns;
 Proper checks at all external borders 
using all relevant databases;
 Including private planes in the PNR 
Directive;
 European system of licences for spe-
cialised buyers of explosive precursors;
 Better protection of victims, includ-
ing the creation of an EU Coordination 
Centre of victims of terrorism (CCVT), 
pre-paid medical costs after an attack, 
and smoother insurance procedures.
The work of TERR was finalized on 
14 November 2018 by the committee’s 
vote on the Hohlmeier/Stevens report. 
Further information on the work of this 
special committee during its mandate 
can be found on the committee’s web-
site. (TW)
Racism and Xenophobia
Council Shapes Rules on Fighting 
Terrorist Content Online 
At its meeting of 6 December 2018, the 
JHA Council adopted its general ap-
proach to the proposed regulation on 
preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online. This proposal had been 
submitted by the European Commission 
on 12 September 2018, following a call 
by EU leaders in June. For the proposal, 
see eucrim 2/2018, pp. 97–98 and the ar-
ticle by G. Robinson in this issue.
The aim of the planned legislation is 
to establish binding rules for hosting ser-
vice providers (HSPs) offering services 
in the EU (whether or not they have 
their main establishment in the Member 
States) to rapidly remove terrorist con-
tent, where necessary. 
HSPs will have to remove terrorist 
content or disable access to it within one 
hour of receiving a removal order from a 
national authority. If HSPs do not com-
ply with removal orders, financial penal-
ties can be imposed on them.
Furthermore, service providers will 
have to apply certain duties of care to 
prevent the dissemination of terror-
ist content on their services. This may 
vary, depending on the risk and level 
of exposure of the service to terrorist 
content.
The establishment of points of con-
tact to facilitate the handling of re-
moval orders and referrals has been de-
signed to improve cooperation between 
law enforcement authorities and service 
providers.
With the adopted general approach, 
the Council is ready to start negotia-
tions. (TW) 
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Collection of Case Law on Hate Crime 
In December 2018, FRA published a 
paper looking at the evolution of the 
ECtHR’s case law relating to hate crime. 
The paper looks at the Court’s rulings 
regarding the duty of state authorities 
to effectively investigate possible rac-
ist motivation under Article 2 ECHR 
and beyond. Furthermore, it analyses the 
Court’s rulings on hate crimes commit-
ted by private persons. Lastly, the paper 
looks at the duty to investigate when 
other bias motivations besides racism 
come into play such as bias related to re-
ligious hatred, disability, political opin-
ion, sexual orientation, or gender-based 
discrimination. (CR)
Online Tool Against Muslim Hatred 
At the beginning of December 2018, 
FRA published a new online tool to as-
sist Member States, policymakers, and 
stakeholders when confronted with anti-
Muslim hatred. 
The database offers information on 
international, European, national, re-
gional, and local-level case law and rul-
ings relating to hate crime, hate speech, 
and discrimination against Muslims. It 
includes the courts’ reasoning, findings, 
and considerations as well as key facts 
for each case. In addition, the database 
contains relevant national, European, 
and international human rights organi-
sation decisions, and reports as well as 
findings by human rights and equality 
bodies and organisations. 
Users can access research, reports, 
studies, data, and statistics on these is-
sues. As an online tool, it offers a unique 
street-level view of victim support ser-
vices in all 28 EU Member States. It also 
provides guidance on where to find ap-
propriate information, support, and pro-
tection. (CR)
 
New Structures at FRA
With the aim of responding better to its 
strategic priorities, FRA started working 
in a new configuration on 16 November 
2018. The agency created a new Insti-
tutional Cooperation and Networks Unit 
as well as a new Technical Assistance 
and Capacity Building Unit next to the 
existing Research and Data, Commu-
nications and Events, and Corporate 
Services Units. The Institutional Coop-
eration and Networks Unit shall work 
closely with FRA’s EU, international, 
and national partners to reinforce hu-
man rights systems and frameworks. 
The Technical Assistance and Capacity 
Building Unit shall help improve FRA’s 
realtime assistance and expertise. (CR)
Procedural Criminal Law
Data Protection
New Data Protection Framework  
for EU Institutions
spot
light
The European Union has a new 
legal framework for the protec-
tion of personal data processed 
by Union institutions, bodies, offices, 
and agencies. The underlying Regula-
tion (EU) 2018/1725 was published in 
the Official Journal of 21 November 
2018 (L 235/39). It repeals Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/ 
2002/EC which date back to the pre-Lis-
bon era and did not cover the processing 
of personal data within all Union institu-
tions and bodies.
The main aim of the new Regulation 
is to adapt its rules to the modern Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (Regu-
lation (EU) 2016/679), which has been 
fully applicable since May 2018. Hence, 
Regulation 2018/1725 establishes a co-
herent framework, while guaranteeing 
the free flow of personal data within the 
Union. It also sets out provisions on the 
European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS). The EDPS is entitled to moni-
tor the application of the provisions of 
this Regulation to all processing opera-
tions carried out by a Union institution 
or body. He is also the first port of call if 
complaints are lodged against infringe-
ments of an individual’s data protection 
rights.
The Regulation is divided into 12 
chapters, including the following:
 General provisions, including scope 
and definitions;
 General data protection principles;
 Rights of the data subject;
 Controller and processor, including 
provisions on security of personal data;
 Transfers of personal data to third 
countries or international organisations;
 EDPS;
 Remedies, liabilities and penalties;
 Review.
Chapter IX contains specific rules 
on “the processing of operational per-
sonal data by Union bodies, offices and 
agencies when carrying out activities 
which fall within the scope of Chapter 4 
or Chapter 5 of Title V of Part Three 
TFEU.” In other words, this concerns 
activities of Union bodies/offices/agen-
cies (as their main or ancillary tasks) 
exercised for the purposes of the pre-
vention, detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of criminal offences. In this 
event, the tailor-made rules of Chapter 
IX apply as a lex specialis.
It must be noted, however, that the 
Regulation does not apply to Europol 
or to the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office until the legal acts establish-
ing Europol and the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (i.e., Regulations 
No 2016/794 and No 2017/1939) are 
amended with a view to rendering this 
chapter (on the processing of opera-
tional personal data) applicable to them 
as adapted. Whether the legal basis of 
these institutions must be adapted to the 
Regulation will be assessed in a review 
process in 2022.
The rules of the Regulation apply 
from 12 December 2018, with an excep-
tion for Eurojust: the Regulation applies 
to the processing of personal data by Eu-
rojust from 12 December 2019. 
In the aftermath of the adoption, the 
EDPS Giovanni Buttarelli welcomed the 
new data protection rules for EU institu-
tions (see press release of 11 December 
2018). He pointed out:
“The new Regulation, which applies 
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from today, brings the data protection 
rules for the EU institutions and bod-
ies (EUI) in line with the standards 
imposed on other organisations and 
businesses by the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR). Under the 
new rules, which we may refer to as the 
EUI-GDPR, the EDPS remains respon-
sible for ensuring the effective protec-
tion of individuals’ fundamental rights 
and freedoms whenever their personal 
data is processed by the EU institutions 
or on their behalf, whether this is to en-
sure EU markets work better, to evalu-
ate and supervise medicines in the EU 
or to fight against terrorism and organ-
ised crime.” 
He also added that the EU institutions 
should take the lead by example in en-
suring the individual’s protection of per-
sonal data. (TW) 
The Awakening of EU Data Retention 
Rules
At the Council meeting of 6–7 Decem-
ber 2018, the JHA ministers of the EU 
Member States reiterated their support 
for EU-wide legislation on data reten-
tion. They encouraged the continuation 
of work at the expert level to develop a 
new concept after the 2006 Directive “on 
the retention of data generated or pro-
cessed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic commu-
nications services or of public commu-
nications networks” was declared void 
by the CJEU in 2014 (“Digital Rights 
Ireland”, see eucrim 1/2014, p. 12). In 
“Tele2 Sverige”, the CJEU further pro-
hibited Member States from maintaining 
national data retention regimes if they 
entail a general and indiscriminate reten-
tion of data (see eucrim 4/2016, p. 164). 
After these judgements, an expert 
group was established in 2017 with the 
task of exploring avenues to reconcile 
the demand for effective law enforce-
ment access to retained data (stored for 
commercial purposes by telecommu-
nication service providers) with the re-
quirements of necessity and proportion-
ality set by the CJEU. (TW)
FRA Handbook on Profiling 
In December 2018, FRA published a 
handbook aiming to contribute to the 
prevention of unlawful profiling. 
The handbook explains what profil-
ing is, when it is unlawful, and what the 
potential negative impacts of unlawful 
profiling for law enforcement and bor-
der management could be. Furthermore, 
it explains the principle and practice of 
lawful profiling and looks at algorithmic 
profiling and its data protection frame-
work.    
The handbook is primarily designed 
for those responsible for training law 
enforcement and border management 
officials. Nevertheless, it may also help 
officers in mid-level positions to imple-
ment profiling techniques lawfully. (CR)
Freezing of Assets
Regulation on Freezing and 
Confiscation Orders
spot
light
The European Parliament and 
the Council adopted a regula-
tion on the mutual recognition 
of freezing orders and confiscation or-
ders. The new legal framework (Regula-
tion (EU) 2018/1805) was published in 
the Official Journal of the EU of 28 No-
vember 2018 (O.J. L 303/1). 
The Regulation replaces the provi-
sions of Framework Decision 2003/577/
JHA as regards the freezing of property 
and Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA 
as of 19 December 2020. It should be 
noted, however, that the existing frame-
work continues to apply to Denmark and 
Ireland, which are not bound by the new 
Regulation. 
The Regulation aims at making the 
freezing and confiscation of criminal as-
sets across the EU quicker and simpler. 
The reform was considered necessary 
because the existing pre-Lisbon legal 
framework was underused and complex. 
Depriving criminals of their assets is 
an important tool in fighting organised 
crime and terrorism. According to a 
2016 Europol study, however, only an 
estimated 1.1% of criminal profits are 
currently confiscated in the EU.
The legislative proposal was con-
troversially discussed; eucrim closely 
monitored the development of the leg-
islation. See: eucrim 4/2016, p. 165 
(Commission proposal), and eucrim 
2/2017, p. 73; eucrim 3/2017, p. 117; 
eucrim 4/2017, p. 176; eucrim 1/2018, 
p. 27; and eucrim 2/2018, p. 102.
The major “innovation” is that, for 
the first time, the EU legislator chose a 
Regulation and not a Directive to gov-
ern future cooperation in an area mutu-
ally enforcing Member States’ orders. 
Against the opposition of several Mem-
ber States (including Germany), which 
favoured a Directive, the provisions of 
the Regulation will be directly appli-
cable, thus hindering Member States 
from implementing the EU instrument 
into their national legal orders. Recital 
53 concedes, however, that “(t)he legal 
form of this act should not constitute 
a precedent for future legal acts of the 
Union in the field of mutual recognition 
of judgments and judicial decisions in 
criminal matters.”
The key features of the new Regula-
tion are as follows:
 The scope has been formulated 
broadly. According to recital 14, “(t)his 
Regulation should cover freezing or-
ders and confiscation orders related to 
criminal offences covered by Directive 
2014/42/EU, as well as freezing orders 
and confiscation orders related to other 
criminal offences.” Thus, the Regula-
tion is not limited to particularly serious 
crimes with a cross-border dimension. 
 It is only decisive that the issuing 
State issue a freezing or confiscation or-
der “within the framework of proceed-
ings in criminal matters.” On the one 
hand, orders issued within the frame-
work of proceedings in civil and admin-
istrative matters have been excluded from 
the scope of the Regulation. On the other 
hand, so-called “non-conviction based 
orders” must be recognised even if such 
orders might not exist in the legal system 
of the executing State (cf. recital 13). 
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 Grounds for non-recognition and 
non-execution are provided for in Art. 8 
(for freezing orders) and Art. 19 (for 
confiscation orders). The most hotly de-
bated issue during the negotiations was 
whether the Regulation should include 
a (more or less general) refusal ground 
if fundamental rights were infringed 
in the issuing state. Germany (in the 
Council) and the EP favoured the intro-
duction of such a refusal ground; how-
ever, the final text was a compromise: 
Art. 8(1)(f) and Art. 19(1)(h) formu-
late a refusal ground in the style of the 
recent CJEU case law in Arranyosi & 
Căldăraru containing a similar refusal 
ground in cases of European Arrest 
Warrants. As a result, non-recognition 
because of fundamental rights infringe-
ments will only be possible in excep-
tional situations.
 The Regulation foresees several time 
limits for the recognition and execution 
of the freezing and confiscation orders 
respectively. They have been designed 
to ensure quick and efficient coopera-
tion. As regards freezing orders, for in-
stance, the executing authority should 
start taking concrete measures neces-
sary to execute such orders no later than 
48 hours after the decision on the rec-
ognition and execution thereof has been 
taken. The text of the Regulation does 
not, however, mention any legal conse-
quences in case of delay.
 The Regulation contains only a few 
rules on legal remedies. In essence, ref-
erence is made to national law. Accord-
ing to Art. 33, “affected persons” have 
the right to effective legal remedies in 
the executing State against the decision 
on the recognition and execution of 
freezing orders pursuant to Art. 7 and 
confiscation orders pursuant to Art. 18. 
The right to a legal remedy must be in-
voked before a court in the executing 
State in accordance with its law. This 
also includes challenges against meas-
ures during the process of execution 
of the orders (Art. 23(1)). However, 
the substantive reasons for issuing the 
freezing order or confiscation order 
must be challenged before a court in the 
issuing State (Art. 33(2)).
 The Regulation pays special atten-
tion to the restitution of frozen property 
to victims. Accordingly, the compensa-
tion and restitution of property to vic-
tims should have priority over the dis-
posal of frozen or confiscated property 
(recital 45). The notion of “victim” is 
to be interpreted in accordance with the 
law of the issuing State, which should 
also be able to provide that a legal per-
son could be a victim for the purpose of 
this Regulation.
 Property claims must be demanded 
in the issuing State (Art. 29(1)). If there 
is a decision to restitute frozen prop-
erty to the victim, the issuing author-
ity must inform the executing authority. 
The executing authority must then take 
the necessary measures to ensure that 
the frozen property is restituted to the 
victim as soon as possible, in accord-
ance with the procedural rules of that 
State. However, this obligation is sub-
ject to three conditions: (1) the victim’s 
title to the property is not contested; (2) 
the property is not required as evidence 
in criminal proceedings in the execut-
ing State; and (3) the rights of affected 
persons are not prejudiced (Art. 29(2)).
 In order for the affected person to 
assert his/her claims, he/she must be 
informed by the executing authority on 
the execution of a freezing or confisca-
tion order (Art. 32). “Affected person” 
is defined in Art. 2(10) as “the natural 
or legal person against whom a freezing 
order or confiscation order is issued, or 
the natural or legal person that owns the 
property that is covered by that order, 
as well as any third parties whose rights 
in relation to that property are directly 
prejudiced by that order under the law 
of the executing State.” 
The annexes of the Regulation con-
tain standardized forms for freezing and 
confiscation certificates. As other stand-
ard forms in EU's judicial cooperation 
instruments they are designed  to ensure 
that EU states act faster and communi-
cate more efficiently. (TW) 
Cooperation
Judicial Cooperation
Council Conclusions on Mutual 
Recognition
At their meeting of 7 December 2018, 
the EU Member States’ Ministers for 
Justice adopted Council conclusions on 
mutual recognition in criminal matters. 
The conclusions contain several calls on 
the Member States, including the fol-
lowing:
 To implement the procedural rights 
Directives in a timely and correct man-
ner and to ensure independence and im-
partiality of the courts and judges;
 To restrictively apply the fundamen-
tal rights exception for non-execution of 
requests in accordance with CJEU case 
law;
 To make use of alternative measures 
to detention in order to reduce the popu-
lation in detention facilities;
 To promote training of practitioners 
(e.g., judges, prosecutors) and exchang-
es between practitioners from different 
Member States;
 To establish (non-binding) guidelines 
on the application of the EU mutual rec-
ognition instruments;
 To make better use of the EJN’s pos-
sibilities and platforms;
 To encourage executing authorities 
to enter into dialogue and direct consul-
tations with the issuing authorities, in 
particular before considering the non-
execution of a decision or judgement;
 To consider the withdrawal of reser-
vations on MLA instruments;
 To set up, as a matter of priority, the 
e-Evidence Digital Exchange System to 
ensure the effective exchange of Euro-
pean Investigation Orders and MLA re-
quests.
The Commission has, inter alia, been 
invited to provide practical guidance on 
the recent CJEU case law, notably re-
garding the Aranyosi case (see eucrim 
1/2016, p. 16, and 2/2018, pp. 103 et 
seq.) and to give reliable and updated in-
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formation on penitentiary establishments 
and prison conditions in the Member 
States. The latter includes translations of 
the CoE’s fact sheets on detention condi-
tions and treatment of prisoners.
Furthermore, the Commission has 
been invited to further develop the hand-
book on the European arrest warrant (see 
eucrim 4/2017, p. 177) and to communi-
cate notifications by Member States on 
EU mutual recognition instruments to 
the EJN, so that they can be published 
on the EJN website. (TW)
CJEU: Obligations of MS if Extradition 
Sought to Enforce Custodial Sentence 
for Union Citizens
On 6 September 2016, the CJEU ren-
dered an important judgment in the Pe-
truhhin case, giving guidance on wheth-
er the extradition of Union citizens from 
an EU country to non-EU countries 
is in line with the Union’s prohibition 
of discrimination (see eucrim 3/2016, 
p. 131). This decision triggered several 
follow-up references for preliminary 
rulings, e.g., the Pisciotti case (eucrim 
1/2018, p. 29) and the Adelsmayr case 
(eucrim 3/2017, pp. 116–117).
Another reference was brought to 
Luxembourg by the Korkein oikeus 
(Finnish Supreme Court), which essen-
tially wanted to know whether (and, if 
yes, how) the concept established in Pe-
truhhin not only applies to extraditions 
for the purpose of prosecution but also 
to those for the purpose of enforcing 
custodial sentences. The Grand Cham-
ber of the CJEU delivered its judgment 
in this case (C-247/17 – Denis Rauge-
vicius) on 13 November 2018.
Facts of the Case and Questions 
Referred
In the case at issue, the Russian authori-
ties requested extradition of Mr. Denis 
Raugevicius, a Lithuanian and Russian 
national, from Finland for the purpose 
of enforcing a custodial sentence of 
four years’ imprisonment for drug pos-
session. Mr. Raugevicius challenged his 
extradition, arguing that he had lived in 
Finland for a considerable length of time 
and that he is the father of two children 
residing in Finland and having the Finn-
ish nationality. The Korkein oikeus was 
unsure whether the CJEU’s Petruhhin 
judgment posed legal barriers to extradi-
tion. On the one hand, Finnish law pro-
hibits the extradition of own nationals 
to countries outside the EU, but not of 
citizens having the nationality of another 
EU Member State (here: Lithuania). On 
the other hand, international agreements 
and Finnish law make provision for the 
possibility that a custodial sentence im-
posed by a third country on a Finnish 
national may be served on Finnish ter-
ritory. 
Therefore, the Finnish court, in es-
sence, posed the question of whether 
Union law also requires extradition al-
ternatives to be applied to Union citi-
zens, so that the effects are less preju-
dicial to the exercise of the right to free 
movement. 
The CJEU’s Answer
First, the CJEU posits its main findings 
in the Petruhhin judgment:
 A national of an EU Member State 
(here: Lithuania) who moved to another 
EU Member State (here: Finland) exer-
cised his right to free movement; there-
fore this situation falls within the scope 
of Art. 18 TFEU, which lays down the 
principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality;
 The national rule that prohibits only 
own nationals from being extradited, 
and not nationals from other EU Mem-
ber States, gives rise to unequal treat-
ment;
 This is a restriction on the freedom 
of movement, within the meaning of 
Art. 21 TFEU;
 This restriction can be justified only 
where it is based on objective consid-
erations and is proportionate to the le-
gitimate objective of the national provi-
sions.
Second, the CJEU reiterated that ex-
tradition is a legitimate means to avoid 
the risk of impunity. In the Petruhhin 
case, however, it was possible to set-
tle the conflict with the Union’s non-
discrimination rule by giving the EU 
country of nationality the opportunity to 
exercise jurisdiction first. 
Although this avenue is barred if ex-
tradition (by a third country) is sought 
for the purpose of enforcing a sentence, 
the requested EU Member State must 
consider mechanisms that are consistent 
with the objective of non-impunity, but 
are less prejudicial to the person’s status 
as Union citizen. 
In this context, the CJEU observed 
that Art. 3 of the Finnish Law on Inter-
national Cooperation provides foreign-
ers who permanently reside in Finland 
with the possibility to serve criminal law 
sanctions imposed abroad in Finland. In 
fact, Finnish law already provides for 
comparable situations in which perma-
nent residents who demonstrate a certain 
degree of integration into the State’s so-
ciety can be treated as Finnish nationals 
(provided the person concerned as well 
as the requesting State consent). 
The CJEU therefore concluded that 
Arts. 18 and 21 TFEU require that na-
tionals of other Member States who re-
side permanently in Finland and whose 
extradition is requested by a third coun-
try for the purpose of enforcing a cus-
todial sentence should benefit from the 
provision preventing extradition from 
being applied to Finnish nationals and 
may, under the same conditions as Finn-
ish nationals, serve their sentences on 
Finnish territory.
Put in Focus
In further development of the Petruh-
hin doctrine, the CJEU’s judgment first 
means that, in situations in which extra-
dition requests from third countries col-
lide with issues of enforcing custodial 
sentences, EU Member States must also 
pay attention to the rights of nationals 
of other EU Member States. The CJEU 
made clear that alternative, mechanisms 
less prejudicial to extradition, which ap-
ply to own nationals, must also be ex-
tended to Union citizens. 
In a second line of reasoning, how-
ever, the CJEU established an important 
restriction: Member States may apply 
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this equal treatment on the condition that 
the Union citizen is a permanent resident 
and has demonstrated its integration into 
the Member State’s society. In this con-
text, previous CJEU case law on who 
can be considered a “permanent resi-
dent” must be recalled. The CJEU also 
emphasised that the person concerned 
may face extradition “on the basis of ap-
plicable national or international law” 
if the courts of the requested Member 
State cannot establish a “permanent resi-
dence.” 
This ruling and the exception to it 
may trigger further references for pre-
liminary rulings. The present ruling 
seems fitting for the Finnish case, specif-
ically the situation of the person sought 
(Mr. Raugevicius) and the particular cir-
cumstances of Finnish law that include 
foreigners in the cross-border enforce-
ment of custodial sentences. 
Several questions remain:
 What if national law only confers the 
possibility to serve foreign custodial 
sentences to its own nationals?
 Which degree of integration must a 
Union citizen have in the requested EU 
Member State?
 To what extent does the State’s obli-
gations go under the traditional principle 
of “aut dedere aut iudicare”? (TW)
European Arrest Warrant
CJEU: Surrender of Resident if 
Executing State Unable to Enforce 
Custodial Sentence 
On 13 December 2018, the CJEU de-
cided on a request for a preliminary rul-
ing that concerned the interpretation of 
Art. 4 No. 6 FD EAW in conjunction 
with the divergent levels of sanctioning 
among the EU Member States.
Facts of the Case
In the case at issue (C-514/17 − Sut), 
Belgium was requested to execute a one-
year-and-two-month custodial sentence 
against Marin-Simion Sut for having 
driven a vehicle without valid licence 
plates and without, for not having a valid 
driving licence, and for having caused an 
accident. Mr. Sut is a Romanian nation-
al, but has lived in Belgium since 2015 
where he is working with his spouse. In 
the proceedings on the execution of the 
Romanian arrest warrant, the Belgian 
Public Prosecutor argued that the Bel-
gian provision implementing Art. 4 No. 
6 FD EAW cannot be applied. Accord-
ing to Art. 4 No. 6 FD EAW, the execu-
tion of an EAW may be refused “if the 
EAW has been issued for the purposes of 
execution of a custodial sentence, where 
the requested person is staying in, or is 
a national or a resident of the executing 
Member State and that State undertakes 
to execute the sentence in accordance 
with its domestic law.”
The Legal Question
The Belgian Public Prosecutor af-
firmed that Mr. Sut is a “resident staying 
in the executing Member State” within 
the meaning of Art. 4 No. 6 FD EAW. 
According to Belgian law, however, the 
offenses at issue can be punished by 
fines only, but conversion of a custodial 
sentence into a fine is expressly prohib-
ited. Therefore, the Romanian sentence 
cannot be enforced in Belgium and the 
EAW must be executed, hence Mr. Sut 
surrendered.
The referring Cour d’appel de Liège 
(Court of Appeal, Liège) had doubts on 
this interpretation with regard to previ-
ous CJEU case law, which stresses the 
importance of the requested person’s 
reintegration into society when the sen-
tence imposed on him expires. 
Decision and Reasoning of the CJEU
The CJEU pointed out that the op-
tional ground for non-execution accord-
ing to Art. 4 No. 6 FD EAW requires two 
conditions to be satisfied in the case at 
issue:
 The person requested must be a “resi-
dent” of the executing Member State;
 The custodial sentence passed in the 
issuing state against that person can ac-
tually be enforced in the executing state 
(while the latter can consider that there 
is a legitimate interest which would jus-
tify the execution of the sentence).
The CJEU further noted that Union 
law allows a certain margin of discre-
tion when implementing Art. 4 No. 6 FD 
EAW. In addition, the more the national 
legislator limits the situations in which 
its national authorities may refuse sur-
render, the more they reinforce the sur-
render system in favour of building up 
an area of freedom, security and justice. 
Against this background, the CJEU 
recognised the importance of poten-
tially increasing the requested person’s 
chances of reintegrating into society 
when the sentence imposed on him ex-
pires, but this cannot prevent a Member 
State from limiting the refusal grounds 
such to give effect to the fundamental 
principle of mutual recognition en-
shrined in Art. 1(2) FD EAW. There-
fore, the executing authority may give 
effect to an EAW if the executing state 
is not able to actually enforce the custo-
dial sentence. 
This is a rather unfavourable result 
for the requested person. The CJEU, 
however, left one back door open: the 
Belgian courts must ascertain whether 
the consequence in the case at issue (i.e., 
Belgium not being in the position of en-
forcing the custodial sentence) is really 
indispensable under Belgian law. In this 
context, two issues must be considered:
 Art. 4 No. 6 FD EAW does not give 
any indication that the executing author-
ity is precluded from refusing the execu-
tion of a EAW if the law of this state pro-
vides only for a fine in response of the 
offence to which the EAW relates;
 The margin of discretion for the na-
tional legislator when implementing 
Art. 4 No. 6 FD should be taken into ac-
count.
As a result, it is ultimately up to the 
referring court whether the Romanian 
EAW must be executed, even though 
the defendant has economic and family 
ties in Belgium and enforcement is only 
be hindered because Belgium foresees a 
lighter penalty for the offense at issue. 
The case shows the repercussions of the 
different levels of sanctioning in the EU. 
(TW)
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CJEU: Consequences of Failure to Refer 
to Additional Sentence in EAW
On 6 December 2018, the CJEU de-
livered its judgment in Case C-551/18 
PPU, which concerns the execution of 
a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is-
sued against IK. The judgment mainly 
concerns the interpretation of Art. 8 FD 
EAW (entitled “content and form of an 
EAW”), but also Art. 15 (communica-
tion of supplementary information) and 
Art. 27 (rule on speciality).
Facts of the Case
In the case at issue, IK was sentenced 
to a primary custodial sentence of three 
years for sexual assault (main sentence). 
In the same judgment, the court ordered 
an “additional sentence of release condi-
tional to placement at the disposal of the 
strafuitvoeringsrechtbank (Court for the 
enforcement of custodial sentences) for 
a 10-year period.” Under Belgian law, 
this additional sentence takes effect af-
ter the expiry of the main sentence and, 
for the purpose of its enforcement, the 
Court responsible for the enforcement of 
custodial sentences is to decide whether 
the convicted person must be deprived 
of liberty or whether he can be released 
conditionally. Accordingly, the person 
“shall be deprived of his liberty if there 
is a risk of him committing serious of-
fences that undermine the physical or 
psychological integrity of third parties 
which, in the context of release under 
supervision, cannot be offset through the 
imposition of special conditions.”
Since IK had left Belgium, the Bel-
gian judicial authorities issued a EAW 
against him for the enforcement of the 
sentence. They indicated the main sen-
tence, the nature and legal classification 
of the offences and the relevant legal 
provisions, and outlined the facts, but 
did not mention the additional sentence 
imposed on IK. The Rechtbank Amster-
dam/the Netherlands, ordered the sur-
render of IK to Belgium for the purposes 
of serving the custodial sentence in Bel-
gium for the offense of sexual assault. 
IK was surrendered and put in cus-
tody for the main sentence. In the subse-
quent proceedings before the Court for 
the enforcement of custodial sentences 
in Antwerp/Belgium, which decided 
on the additional sentence, IK claimed 
that the court cannot take this decision 
because the additional sentence was not 
subject to the surrender by the Dutch au-
thorities. 
In the following, the Dutch authorities 
denied a request by the Belgium authori-
ties, which sought additional authorisa-
tion in respect of the additional sentence 
pursuant to Art. 27 FD EAW. The Dutch 
authorities argued that Art. 27 concerns 
the sentencing or prosecution of an of-
fence other than the one for which sur-
render was authorized, which did not 
apply to the present case.
The Antwerp court then rejected IK’s 
arguments and ordered the maintenance 
of his deprivation of liberty.
Reference for the Preliminary Ruling
Upon appeal, the Hof van Cassatie 
(Court of Cassation) decided to refer 
the case to the CJEU, asking about the 
impact of the failure to mention the ad-
ditional sentence in the EAW on the fur-
ther proceedings regarding this sentence 
in Belgium. 
The main question was, in essence, 
whether non-compliance with Art. 8(1)
(f) of the FD EAW, which provides for 
the necessity to include in the EAW re-
quest the penalty imposed, precludes the 
enforcement of the additional sentence.
Decision and Reasoning  
of the CJEU 
At first, the CJEU reiterated the main 
principles of the EAW scheme that had 
already been mentioned in previous 
judgments:
 The EAW is based on mutual trust 
that requires each of the EU Member 
States, save in exceptional circumstanc-
es, to consider all the other Member 
States to be in complyiance with EU law 
and particularly with the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law;
 Based on the principle of mutual rec-
ognition, the EU system of surrender 
replaces the conventional multilateral 
system of extradition;
 The FD EAW seeks to facilitate and 
accelerate judicial cooperation by con-
tributing to the attainment of the Union’s 
objective of becoming an area of free-
dom, security and justice;
 The FD EAW pursues the policy that 
the crime committed does not go unpun-
ished;
 Refusal to execute a EAW is only 
possible on the grounds for non-execu-
tion exhaustively listed in the FD EAW 
(Arts. 3–5); accordingly, execution of 
the EAW is the rule, whereas refusal is 
the exception.
Although the CJEU decided that fail-
ure to comply with the formal require-
ments of Art. 8(1) FD EAW can result in 
the executing authority not giving effect 
to a EAW (cf. Case C-241/15, Bob-Do-
gi, eucrim 2/2016, p. 80), the CJEU ob-
serves that it must be examined to what 
extent failure to indicate an additional 
sentence in a EAW affects the exercise 
of jurisdiction that the executing author-
ity derives from Arts. 3–5 FD EAW.
The CJEU put forth that the purpose 
of Art. 8(1)(f) is to give information, 
so that the executing authority can de-
cide whether it has to refuse the EAW 
because the thresholds of Art. 2(1) FD 
EAW for the execution of a custodial 
sentence (min. four months) have not 
been ascertained. In the present case, 
this threshold was unproblematic (the 
main sentence against IK was three 
years’ imprisonment). Hence, the ex-
ecuting authority could do nothing but 
grant the surrender.
As a result, the CJEU ruled that, in 
circumstances such as those at issue in 
the main proceedings, the fact that the 
European arrest warrant did not indicate 
the additional sentence cannot affect the 
execution of that sentence in the issuing 
Member State following surrender.
Subsequently, the CJEU dealt with 
several counterarguments and dismissed 
them. In particular, it reasoned as fol-
lows:
 The rule of speciality, as referred to in 
Art. 27 FD EAW, does not apply in the 
present case, because it only concerns 
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offences other than those on which the 
surrender was based;
 Failure to indicate the additional 
sentence does not trigger the report-
ing mechanism of Art. 15(3) FD EAW; 
therefore, the executing judicial authori-
ty need not be informed of the additional 
sentence in advance.
Ultimately, the CJEU pointed out that 
the rights of the person concerned were 
guaranteed. He can challenge the main-
tenance of the deprivation of liberty be-
fore the Belgian courts.
Put in Focus
After the Bob-Dogi judgment, the 
CJEU delivered another judgment on the 
consequences of failure to comply with 
the formal requirements of an EAW. 
In essence, it links the requirements of 
Art. 8 FD EAW with the substantial re-
fusal grounds in Art. 3 et seq. FD. If the 
failure to comply formally has no effect 
on the jurisdiction of the executing au-
thority, enabling it to apply one of the 
listed refusal grounds, the formal failure 
is negligible. The person concerned is 
referred to the legal remedies as pro-
vided for in the legal order of the issuing 
state. 
The judgement also clarifies the ap-
plicability of the rule on speciality 
(Art. 27 FD EAW) and the scope of the 
reporting mechanism of Art. 15(3) FD 
EAW. (TW)
Law Enforcement Cooperation
Council Pushes for E-Evidence Law, EP 
Applies the Brakes
On 7 December 2018, under the Austri-
an Presidency, the JHA Council agreed 
on its position on a proposal for a reg-
ulation on European production and 
preservation orders for e-evidence in 
criminal matters (for the proposal, see 
eucrim 1/2018, pp. 35–36 and the article 
by S. Tosza in this issue). The new le-
gal framework foresees that judicial and 
law enforcement authorities can quickly 
obtain and efficiently secure evidence 
stored electronically by directly sending 
respective orders to service providers. If 
service providers do not comply with the 
orders, they can be sanctioned. The loca-
tion of the data should no longer play a 
role.
Debate in the Council was contro-
versial, however, with seven Member 
States, including Germany, disagreeing 
with the general approach of the Coun-
cil. The countries particularly raised 
concerns about overly harsh infringe-
ments of the fundamental rights to pri-
vacy and the protection of personal data. 
The major amendment proposed by 
the Council in comparison to the Com-
mission is the establishment of a – lim-
ited – notification system: if content data 
are concerned and if the issuing author-
ity believes the person whose data are 
sought is not residing on its own terri-
tory, the issuing authority must inform 
the enforcing state and give it an oppor-
tunity to flag whether the data requested 
may fall under the following categories:
 Data protected by immunities and 
privileges; 
 Data subject to rules on determina-
tion and limitation of criminal liabil-
ity related to freedom of expression/the 
press; 
 Data whose disclosure may impact 
fundamental interests of the state.
The issuing authority shall take these 
circumstances into account, and it shall 
not issue or adapt the order. The notifi-
cation does not entail a suspensive ef-
fect. Such notification procedure was 
requested from several parties, since it 
follows similar rules in international co-
operation in criminal matters, e.g., the 
interception of telecommunication data 
without the need for technical assistance 
of a requested state.
Meanwhile, the European Parliament 
dampened expectations that it will fi-
nalise the legislation by the end of the 
parliamentary term in May 2019. Dur-
ing a hearing organised by the (mainly 
responsible) LIBE Committee, MEPs 
voiced critical concerns over the Com-
mission proposal. In a working docu-
ment, the main rapporteur, Birgit Sippel 
(S&D, Germany), took up the criticism 
already put forward by legal experts, 
practitioners, and NGOs (also see in this 
regard eucrim 1/2018, p. 36; 2/2018, 
pp. 107–108, and 3/2018, pp. 162–163). 
She pointed out that the serious legal 
questions must be addressed in a com-
prehensive manner and concluded:
“With regards to the numerous consul-
tations conducted so far (in shadows’ 
meetings, the LIBE hearing, as well as 
in bilateral meetings with involved par-
ties), but also publications received (in 
particular An assessment of the Com-
mission’s proposals on electronic evi-
dence, commissioned by the EP Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs at the request of 
the LIBE Committee), the Rapporteur 
together with the shadows has identified 
several legal areas that will need further 
clarification, in order to guarantee the 
drafting of a legally sound legal instru-
ment regarding the production and pres-
ervation of e-evidence.” (TW) 
Civil Society Organisations Voice 
Concerns over Council Plans  
on E-Evidence
Eighteen civil society organisations 
urged Member States to seriously recon-
sider its draft position on law enforce-
ment access to “e-evidence” on the eve 
of the vote on the general approach in 
the Council. In a letter of 5 Decem-
ber 2018, the organisations point out 
that the draft presented by the Austrian 
Presidency fails to solve the fundamen-
tal concerns of the e-evidence proposal 
(for the proposal, see eucrim 1/2018, 
pp. 35–36 and the article by S. Tosza in 
this issue; for other critical reactions, 
see eucrim 2/2018, pp. 107–108, and 
3/2018, pp. 162–163). In particular, the 
following issues have been raised:
 Considerable reduction in the possi-
bility for enforcing authorities to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of an order 
on the basis of a violation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights;
 Erroneous assumption that non-con-
tent data is less sensitive than content 
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data, contrary to CJEU and ECtHR case 
law; 
 Contemplation of the possibility to is-
sue orders without court validation, dis-
regarding CJEU case law (e.g., in Tele 2 
Sverige);
 Failure to provide legal certainty; 
 Undermining of the role of executing 
states, thereby undermining judicial co-
operation.
In sum, the concerns over fundamen-
tal rights already raised have grown 
even more with the new text. (TW)
US CLOUD Act: EU Wants Executive 
Agreement with the U.S.
With the “CLOUD Act” of March 2018, 
the U.S. rushed ahead in facilitating law 
enforcement access to data held by U.S. 
service providers, such as Microsoft, Fa-
cebook, and Google. It also gave foreign 
law enforcement authorities the possibil-
ity to bypass existing MLA procedures 
and to directly request communication 
content of “non-U.S. persons” located 
outside the U.S. from U.S.-based pro-
viders, subject to specified requirements 
(see eucrim 1/2018, p. 36). 
One pre-condition is the conclu-
sion of an “executive agreement” with 
the “foreign government,” which must 
meet a number of criteria (e.g., adequate 
substantive and procedural laws on cy-
bercrime and e-evidence, respect for 
the rule of law, non-discrimination and 
respect for human rights, accountabil-
ity and transparency mechanisms, etc.). 
Requests must be limited to “serious 
crimes.” For the U.S. CLOUD Act and 
the executive agreements, see the article 
by J. Daskal in this issue. 
The conclusion of an executive agree-
ment is subject to a positive determina-
tion by the U.S. Attorney General before 
it is submitted to the US Congress. The 
EU and the U.S. agreed that the U.S. 
will negotiate one agreement with the 
EU instead of bilateral agreements with 
individual Member States. The Com-
mission and the Council are preparing 
the mandate in order to start the negotia-
tions. (TW)
New Measures to Disrupt Migrant 
Smuggling Networks
With the aim of disrupting migrant smug-
gling networks, both inside and outside 
the EU, the Council approved a set of 
measures with a law enforcement focus 
on 6 December 2018. These new meas-
ures shall enhance the inter-agency ap-
proach, both at EU and national levels, 
make the best use of synergies among the 
operational tools available, and maximise 
the use of the external assets of the EU.
Hence, the operational and analyti-
cal capacities of the European Migrant 
Smuggling Center (EMSC) at Europol 
shall be increased and a stronger link 
between frontline information and infor-
mation analysis capacities established. 
Furthermore, a joint liaison task force on 
migrant smuggling shall be set up with-
in the EMSC. In order to better disrupt 
online communications, Europol’s EU 
Internet Referral Unit shall be strength-
ened. (CR)
Foundations
European Court of Human Rights
20th Anniversary of European Court  
of Human Rights
On 1 November 2018, it was the twen-
tieth anniversary of the entry into force 
of Protocol No. 11 and the setting up of 
a single, full-time ECtHR. The protocol 
also established the right of individual 
petition to over 800 million Europeans. 
Following the entry into force of Pro-
tocol No. 11 on 1 November 1998, the 
new, permanent Court replaced the ex-
isting European Commission and Court 
of Human Rights in order to strengthen 
the efficiency of the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. In the 
last 20 years, the new Court has dealt 
with more than 800,000 applications, 
delivering nearly 21,000 judgments.
Speaking at a seminar organized dur-
ing the Finnish presidency of the CoE 
on 26 November 2018, ECtHR Presi-
dent Raimondi hailed the establishment 
of the new Court as a landmark in the 
development of international human 
rights protection. He further noted that 
only a little over 58,000 applications 
are currently pending before the Court, 
which is down from the high number of 
160,000 applications pending in 2011. 
First Case for Advisory Opinion  
under Protocol No. 16
On 3 December 2018, the Grand Cham-
ber panel of five judges accepted a re-
quest for an advisory opinion under 
Protocol No. 16. This is the first case 
(received on 16 October 2018 from the 
French Court of Cassation) since the en-
try into force of Protocol No. 16 to the 
ECHR on 1 August 2018 (see eucrim 
2/2018, p. 109). The case raises ques-
tions on legal mother-child relationship 
and compliance with the requirements of 
Article 8 of the Convention when regis-
  Council of Europe*
   Reported by Dr. András Csúri
* If not stated otherwise, the news reported in 
the following sections cover the period 16 No-
vember – 31 December 2018.
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tering the birth of a child born abroad to 
a surrogate mother.
Protocol No 16 allows the highest 
courts and tribunals to request the ECtHR 
to give advisory opinions on questions 
of principle relating to the interpreta-
tion or application of the rights and free-
doms defined in the Convention or its 
protocols. An advisory opinion may be 
requested only in the context of a case 
pending before a domestic court. A pan-
el of five judges decides whether to ac-
cept or reject the request. The advisory 
opinions given by the Grand Chamber 
provide reasons and are not binding.
Specific Areas of Crime
Corruption
GRECO: Fifth Round Evaluation Report 
on Estonia
On 7 December 2018, GRECO pub-
lished its fifth round evaluation report on 
Estonia. The main focus of this evalu-
ation round is on preventing corruption 
and promoting integrity in central gov-
ernments (top executive functions) and 
law enforcement agencies. The evalua-
tion sets particular focus on issues such 
as conflicts of interest, the declaration of 
assets, and accountability mechanisms 
(for the fifth evaluation round, see eu-
crim 2/2017, p. 76; for more recent re-
ports, see eucrim 1/2018, pp. 38–39 and 
2/2018, pp. 109–110).
In general, GRECO observed that 
the comprehensive legislative frame-
work and online tools in place in Esto-
nia provide a sound basis for prevent-
ing corruption amongst all officials. 
There are, however, a number of areas 
in which improvements are necessary 
and recommended. Currently, a code of 
conduct is lacking that would cover all 
relevant government actors (ministers, 
senior civil servants, and political advis-
ers). GRECO recommends laying down 
clear standards, illustrated by concrete 
examples of the risk of conflicts of in-
terest. These standards should be made 
clear to anyone taking up a government 
position from the outset. In addition, po-
litical advisers, like ministers and senior 
civil servants, should also submit dec-
larations of interest as part of their re-
cruitment process, so as to identify any 
conflicts of interest. While acknowledg-
ing the good level of transparency of the 
legislative process in Estonia, GRECO 
sees room for further improvement by 
clear rules on reporting as well as disclo-
sure by ministers, senior civil servants, 
and political advisers of contact to lob-
byists/third parties that seek to influence 
the public decision-making process. The 
report further recommends the adoption 
of rules to prevent the risks of revolv-
ing doors – when government officials 
shift to the private sector – with a view 
to preventing lobbying of the govern-
ment or the immediate acceptance of 
employment in a sector that was previ-
ously within the remit of their govern-
ment duties.
The report acknowledges that, over 
the last several years, the Police and 
Border Guard Board has built up a 
strong practice to prevent corruption 
within its own ranks, which has also 
led to an increased level of public trust. 
GRECO further welcomes that the Es-
tonian police service reportedly has the 
highest percentage of women in Europe, 
yet recommends improving gender rep-
resentation at higher management levels 
within the police.
The report recommends focusing on 
two particular issues in order to prevent 
conflicts of interest in the police service: 
the increasing number of police officers 
taking up secondary employment in ad-
dition to their regular police work, on the 
one hand, and the type of employment 
they take after they leave the Police and 
Border Guard Board, on the other. The 
report also recommends reviewing the 
safeguards in place when it comes to in-
ternal police investigations. In addition, 
GRECO calls for improvements regard-
ing the process of appointing the Direc-
tor General of the Police and Border 
Guard Board, the rotation of police staff 
working in areas exposed to particular 
risks of corruption, and the protection of 
whistleblowers.
Money Laundering
MONEYVAL: Fifth Round Evaluation 
Report on Albania
On 17 December 2018, MONEYVAL 
published its fifth-round evaluation re-
port on Albania. The fifth evaluation 
round builds on previous MONEYVAL 
assessments by strengthening the exami-
nation of how effectively Member States 
prevent and combat ML and terrorism 
financing (TF). See also eucrim 1/2018, 
pp. 40–41 and 2/2018, p. 111 with fur-
ther references. The report calls on the 
Albanian authorities to step up their ef-
forts in pursuing launderers, when con-
fiscating assets connected to significant 
proceeds-generating offences and in 
tackling terrorist financing risks. 
Corruption poses major money laun-
dering risks in Albania. Often linked to 
organised crime activities, it generates 
substantial amounts of criminal pro-
ceeds and seriously undermines the ef-
fective functioning of the criminal jus-
tice system. The authorities are aware 
of the risks from corruption, but law en-
forcement has paid limited attention to 
targeting corruption-related ML so far. 
A significant judicial reform is currently 
being implemented to better address the 
corruption risks prevalent in the country.
MONEYVAL acknowledges that the 
Albanian authorities have a reasonably 
good understanding of the country’s ML 
risks and have at their disposal national 
coordination mechanisms for policy-
making to address risks. However, these 
mechanisms have not proven fully effec-
tive. Therefore, the report recommends 
enhancing the analysis of ML and TF 
risks to implement appropriate mitiga-
tion measures, most notably by way of: 
 Conducting a more in-depth TF risk 
assessment; 
 Understanding the impact of the in-
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formal economy and of corruption (in-
cluding its nexus with organised crime) 
on ML/TF risks; 
 Assessing the risk posed by legal per-
sons (including through ownership/con-
trol by foreign legal arrangements).
The competent authorities system-
atically use wide-ranging sources of 
information to initiate and facilitate in-
vestigations of ML, associated predicate 
offences, and terrorist financing. How-
ever, these investigations rarely result in 
indictments. ML proceedings connected 
to significant parallel proceeds-generat-
ing offences are usually suspended or 
dismissed by the prosecution. Therefore, 
MONEYVAL recommends reviewing 
the reasons behind the low performance 
of the prosecution in ML investigations 
and pursuing more indictments in ML 
cases involving foreign proceeds. To 
this end, better use could be made of 
circumstantial evidence concerning the 
predicate crimes committed abroad if 
such evidence is available. 
Though Albania has a robust legal 
framework for confiscation of crimi-
nal proceeds, the number and value 
of seized and confiscated assets is not 
commensurate with the level of crimi-
nality in the country. MONEYVAL rec-
ommends ensuring that adequate efforts 
are made to identify criminal proceeds 
located abroad and take appropriate ac-
tions for their confiscation.
With regard to terrorist financing, 
MONEYVAL notes that the perception 
and understanding of the related risks 
does not seem to adequately address the 
characteristics of potential TF activities 
in the country and the Western Balkan 
region. There is no systematic approach 
towards identifying and investigating fi-
nancing aspects of terrorism-related of-
fences. 
MONEYVAL acknowledges that the 
Bank of Albania has a good understand-
ing of ML and TF risks, recently enhanc-
ing its offsite reporting system to support 
its assessment of risks of individual enti-
ties. However, inspections by the Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority (FSA) have 
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been very limited so far, even though the 
authority is in the process of transition-
ing to a risk-based approach in supervi-
sion. Despite important efforts, neither 
the Bank of Albania nor the FSA con-
sistently apply a risk-based perspective 
when reviewing applications for licens-
es by financial institutions or take a sys-
tematic approach to monitoring them in 
order to fully mitigate the risk of crimi-
nal infiltration. Therefore, MONEYVAL 
recommends:
 Ensuring the implementation of high 
standards (which should include a com-
prehensive framework of screening ap-
plicants/indirect shareholders); 
 Assessing criminal records beyond 
criminal convictions, current proceed-
ings, and potential links to criminal as-
sociates; 
 Obtaining international cooperation 
whenever appropriate; 
 Implementing ongoing mechanisms 
to check the integrity status of exiting 
licences.
Albania has reportedly provided mu-
tual legal assistance with an appropriate 
level of cooperation, but the general legal 
mechanism for executing foreign mutual 
legal assistance requests shows deficien-
cies. Therefore, the report recommends 
taking legislative steps to simplify the 
existing legal framework for executing 
MLA requests and introducing a case 
management system (CMS), which also 
allows for the systemic prioritisation of 
MLA cases for all authorities involved. 
Furthermore, direct cooperation be-
tween counterpart judicial authorities 
should be encouraged.
Based on the results of its evaluation, 
MONEYVAL decided to apply its en-
hanced follow-up procedure to Albania. 
MONEYVAL: AML/CFT Report on Israel 
Triggers the Country’s Membership  
to the FATF
On 10 December 2018, FATF and 
MONEYVAL published a mutual as-
sessment report on Israel’s anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
(AML/CFT) system, the effectiveness of 
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measures in place, and their level of com-
pliance with FATF Recommendations. 
Israel became an observer to the 
FATF in February 2016. Until then it 
had already been closely involved in 
the work of the FATF through its partic-
ipation in MONEYVAL. Since the start 
of its observer status in February 2016, 
Israel has worked to meet the require-
ments for full membership of the FATF, 
which include undergoing a successful 
mutual evaluation. With publication 
of the assessment report, Israel met 
FATF’s membership requirements and 
became an official member of FATF 
with immediate effect.
The report underlines that Israel’s 
geographic location means it faces a 
particularly high terrorist financing (TF) 
risk from external sources. Specific TF 
sources and channels identified by the 
report are: 
 Funding from other jurisdictions;
 Supposedly legitimate business ac-
tivities;
 Donations; 
 Foreign non-profit organisations 
(NPOs);
 Smuggling of goods, valuables, and 
funds through border crossings, includ-
ing through trade; and the use of money 
transfer mechanisms. 
Fraud, tax offences, organised crime 
and public sector corruption are among 
the ML risks. 
As regards risk assessment and policy 
setting, the report states that Israel has a 
good understanding of the risks it is ex-
posed to, has developed a sound and ef-
fective AML/CFT system, demonstrates 
an effective policy of timely prevention, 
and achieves good results in investigat-
ing, prosecuting, and convicting ML and 
TF. Great emphasis is also placed on 
depriving criminals of the illicit gains, 
assets, and instruments of crime at an 
average of over €24 million per year in 
confiscations.
However, the report identified areas 
requiring major improvement: 
 Introducing and strengthening the 
supervision and implementation of pre-
ventive measures;
 Coordination in preventing the mis-
use of non-profit organisations for TF, 
in particular by increasing Israel’s re-
sources to register and supervise these 
organisations.
Financial institutions and their su-
pervisors have a good understanding 
of the ML and TF risks they face. This 
understanding is weaker in the money 
service sector, though there has been a 
significant increase in this sector’s re-
porting of unusual activities recently. 
Financial supervisors generally have not 
yet developed a full, risk-based AML/
CFT-specific supervision. Israel has 
not included real estate agents, dealers 
in precious metals, and trust and com-
pany service providers in its AML/CFT 
system. Lawyers and accountants are 
not required to report suspicious trans-
actions. Among the recommendations 
related to financial institutions, the re-
port suggests ensuring that all financial 
institutions, especially smaller firms, ap-
ply adequate background checks when 
hiring new employees, instead of just 
relying on applicants’ self-assessment. 
Furthermore, it calls on financial insti-
tutions to continue providing up-to-date 
and AML/CFT-specific training to staff. 
The supervisors of designated non-fi-
nancial businesses and professions (DN-
FBPs) have a reasonable understanding 
of ML/TF risks and obligations, but are 
at an early stage in the development of 
a risk-based model for supervision. The 
report recommends the following in this 
regard:
 Extending AML/CFT obligations to 
all DNFBPs that are currently not cov-
ered by the national AML/CFT regime;
 Developing and enhancing their un-
derstanding of ML/TF risks and obliga-
tions; 
 Updating supervised entities and self-
regulatory bodies on how their sectors 
could be misused for ML/TF purposes;
 Verification of customer and transac-
tion information in a timely manner and 
on a regular basis by DNFBPs.
Furthermore, diamond dealers should 
apply adequate background checks 
when hiring new employees. 
Authorities must make effective use of 
financial intelligence and other informa-
tion and co-operate well with international 
counterparts. That said, some issues have 
arisen with delays in executing requests 
for international cooperation. In this re-
gard, the report recommends continuing 
with the planned increase in human re-
sources to assist in the timely execution of 
MLA requests, to improve the response 
time for incoming extradition requests 
(whether through additional resources or 
dedicated staff to handle such requests 
or through enhanced interaction with 
foreign counterparts), and to stream-
line the process for handling incoming 
MLAs requiring investigative action. 
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Articles
Articles / Aufsätze
The European Union already has an impressive track record 
when it comes to the protection of its citizens’ data. Yet the 
challenges posed by the digital revolution are not limited to 
protecting people’s privacy, but also require finding effec-
tive ways to access data when need be, including for crimi-
nal investigations. The lack of a comprehensive framework 
in that respect currently results in more informal solutions 
based on the voluntary cooperation of service providers, not 
necessarily with due regard to the protection of fundamen-
tal rights. This problem is also a good example of a broader 
phenomenon linked with the technological revolution: the 
role of service providers as partners in law enforcement. 
Their role is not only instrumental in the gathering of e-ev-
idence, but also, for instance, in the fight against the dis-
semination of illicit content online.
The contributions in this issue of eucrim touch upon all 
these difficulties. The first two articles – by S. Tosza and by 
J. Daskal – deal with the same problem: law enforcement 
access to data held by service providers for the purpose 
of criminal investigation. As data is very often held in a dif-
ferent country than the place of criminal investigation, the 
complexity of instruments necessary to obtain such data is 
out of proportion. S. Tosza presents the EU initiative aimed 
at creating a legal framework for direct requests for elec-
tronic evidence sent by law enforcement authorities in the 
EU to service providers in another EU Member State (the 
“e-evidence initiative”). J. Daskal discusses the recent 
changes in U.S. law, which should facilitate the transfer of 
data from U.S. service providers to authorities in the EU.
The immense growth in data-analysing capacities has 
thrown into question the traditional classification of data, 
as even non-content data may be extremely revealing 
when gathered in sufficient quantity and properly analysed. 
C. Warken critically analyses the current approach to clas-
sifying data and proposes a new take on the matter.
G. Robinson examines the European Commission’s proposal 
for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online. This highly relevant initiative largely relies 
on the good cooperation of service providers, including 
their proactive role. 
Katalin Ligeti, University of Luxembourg and eucrim Editorial 
Board Member & Stanislaw Tosza, University of Utrecht
 Fil Rouge
The European Commission’s Proposal  
on Cross-Border Access to E-Evidence 
Overview and Critical Remarks
Dr. Stanislaw Tosza
With human activity becoming more and more dependent on digital technologies, criminal investigations increasingly depend 
on digital evidence. Yet the gathering of this type of evidence is far from straightforward. Besides technological challenges, 
one of the major obstacles that law enforcement authorities encounter is the fact that the data they need is often stored abroad 
or by a foreign service provider. At the international level, this results in the need to resort to mutual legal assistance and, at 
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I.  Introduction 
A large number of criminal offences, not only cybercrime, is 
currently committed in a way that leaves digital traces that 
can serve as evidence. In order to effectively investigate and 
prosecute these offences, law enforcement must have access 
to digital data, which is mostly in the possession of service 
providers, often located abroad. The law of criminal procedure 
allows the authorities to access this data, while protecting sus-
pects’ procedural safeguards. However, when the service pro-
vider is located in another country or the data is stored abroad, 
law enforcement should in principle resort to mutual legal as-
sistance (MLA) because their coercive powers are limited to 
their national territory. 
As the significance of digital or electronic evidence has grown, 
so has the frustration of law enforcement with the cumbersome 
procedure to acquire this data in combination with the number 
of cases when digital evidence is needed and the relevant data 
is held abroad. This has stimulated attempts to find unilateral 
solutions forcing providers to deliver data not stored in the 
territory of the requesting state circumventing the MLA pro-
cedure, which resulted in significant litigation,1 and calls for 
reform of the framework. The latter is not an easy undertaking, 
as the complexity of the issue is composed of problems linking 
criminal procedure, international law, in particular questions 
of jurisdiction and sovereignty in the context of criminal in-
vestigations, EU law as well as the impact of fast developing 
technology, in particular cloud computing or encryption.2 
With the Conclusions of 9 June 2016 the JHA Council request-
ed the Commission to develop a legal framework that would 
allow law enforcement to obtain relevant data.3 This request 
led to the proposal of the Commission of 17 April 2018 that 
is composed of two instruments: a regulation and a directive.4 
The aim of this contribution is to provide an overview of and a 
few critical remarks on the Commission’s proposal, in particu-
lar focusing on the draft regulation, which is the main compo-
nent of the legislative initiative.
At the same time, legislative work has also progressed in the 
U.S., with the ultimate adoption of the CLOUD Act in March 
2018, which is meant to facilitate access to data held by U.S. 
companies by non-U.S. law enforcement authorities. This act 
is the subject of the contribution by Jennifer Daskal in this 
issue of eucrim.
II.  Commission’s Proposal
The envisaged regulation would create two new instruments: 
a European Production Order (EPdO) and a European Preser-
vation Order (EPsO).5 An EPdO is defined as “a binding deci-
sion by an issuing authority of a Member State compelling a 
service provider offering services in the Union and established 
or represented in another Member State, to produce electronic 
evidence” (Art. 2(1) of the draft regulation6). An EPsO is “a 
binding decision by an issuing authority of a Member State 
compelling a service provider offering services in the Union 
and established or represented in another Member State, to 
preserve electronic evidence in view of a subsequent request 
for production” (Art. 2(2)). It is interesting to note that an 
EPsO may result not only in an EPdO, but also for instance in 
a mutual legal assistance request or a European Investigation 
Order (Art. 6(2)).
The crucial characteristic of the Commission’s proposal is 
that the orders goes from the issuing authority in one Member 
State directly to the service provider in another Member State 
and the data should go back the same way. The involvement of 
an authority in the executing state is, in principle, avoided and 
the basic check of the order is done by the service provider. 
In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the regulation, the 
second piece of the Commission’s proposal, i.e. the directive, 
obliges the Member States to provide for a framework assur-
ing that there is a known and empowered legal representative 
of a service provider to whom the order may be addressed. 
The choice both of the legal basis and of the legal instrument 
is noteworthy: The directive, which must be transposed by 
the EU Member States, has an internal market legal basis (see 
also 2. below), whereas the – binding and directly applicable 
− regulation is based on Art. 82(1) TFEU, which provides for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters on the basis of the mu-
tual recognition principle. While being a regulation, a number 
of issues will have to be clarified by national law, most notably 
sanctions and remedies (see below). 
the EU level, to the European Investigation Order. Even the length of the procedure when resorting to the EIO is far too slow, be-
cause relevant data can be lost in the meantime. This article discusses the initiative of the European Commission to establish 
a European legal framework regarding direct requests for electronic evidence sent by law enforcement authorities in the EU 
to service providers in another EU Member State (the “e-evidence initiative”). The initiative, which is currently under debate 
in the EU Parliament after the Council agreed on proposed amendments, is not without controversy. The article analyses its 
overall structure and the most important aspects of its design, and it offers critical remarks on several major elements of the 
initiative.
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1.  Draft Regulation
a)  What may an order be issued for? 
The EPdO and the EPsO have the same objective: they oblige 
the service provider to respectively produce or preserve elec-
tronic evidence. The term “electronic evidence” is explained 
in Art. 2(6). This definition is characterised by three elements: 
Firstly, evidence must be stored in an electronic form either 
by the service provider or on its behalf. Secondly, it has to 
be stored at the time of receipt of the EPdO or EPsO. This 
means that the order concerns the data that is already in the 
possession of the service provider and not any data to be ob-
tained in the future, thus excluding any future surveillance. 
Thirdly, the term evidence is not defined as such, but the defi-
nition provides for four types of data of which that evidence 
might consist: subscriber data, access data, transactional data 
and content data. 
These four categories of data are further defined in the draft 
regulation in Art. 2(7)–(10). The spectrum includes content 
and non-content data, with the latter being divided into three 
categories (subscriber data, access data, transactional data). 
In terms of infringement of fundamental rights, the regulation 
provides two groups of categories of data: subscriber and ac-
cess data on the one hand, which are considered less intrusive, 
and transactional and content data, where the intrusiveness is 
deemed more significant. The differentiation particularly af-
fects the possibility of using the order, which is limited to some 
categories of offences for the second group, whereas it is open 
to all offences for subscriber and access data. Furthermore, 
the differentiation has an impact on the radius of the action of 
the prosecutor’s, who is excluded from the list of competent 
issuing authorities when it comes to transactional and content 
data. As per the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal, the 
differentiation between the two categories is made according 
to the following philosophy: data related only to the identifica-
tion of the user is less intrusive and can be made more acces-
sible, whereas data involving predominantly the content of a 
person’s activity should be more protected.7 The Explanatory 
Memorandum considers that the starting point of an investi-
gation is often the subscriber data or access data in order to 
reveal the identity of the suspect, before data about the content 
is sought. 
b)  Who may issue the order? 
While the Member States may differ as to which authorities 
they give the right to ask for data from service providers in 
the national context, the draft proposes a quasi-harmonised 
approach in that regard. It should be borne in mind, that no 
margin of discretion is allowed, because no implementation of 
the provisions of a regulation is needed (see above). The Com-
mission singled out three categories of authorities that can be 
entitled to issue an EPdO or EPsO (Art. 4). 
The first group contains authorities that are entitled to issue 
both types of orders and for all types of data: judges, courts 
and investigative judges. The second group is composed of 
prosecutors whose authority is limited to what the draft con-
siders to be less sensitive measures (cf. recital 30 of the pream-
ble). Prosecutors may issue an EPsO for any type of data, but 
an EPdO only for subscriber and access data. Given the fact 
that a regulation (and not a directive) will be enacted, it does 
not seem to be possible for the Member States to restrict the 
circle of authorities entitled to issue the orders, e.g. by further 
limiting the power of the prosecutor. As a result, it may happen 
that a prosecutor might be in the position to issue an EPsO for 
content data at the European level, while he or she would not 
be able to do so in a purely domestic context.
The third group is defined as follows: “any other competent 
authority as defined by the issuing State which, in the specific 
case, is acting in its capacity as an investigating authority in 
criminal proceedings with competence to order the gathering 
of evidence in accordance with national law.” Such orders will 
need to be examined for their conformity with the conditions 
set out for the validity of the orders. The authorities entitled to 
validate the order are the same two (aforementioned) groups 
as those for issuing the orders, according to the same range of 
competences (with the prosecutor’s competence limited to the 
less intrusive types of data). In other words, the third category 
would include authorities that are equipped with the neces-
sary power to gather electronic evidence according to the na-
tional laws of the Member States. Thus, prosecutors can also 
be entitled to ask for transactional and content data, but with 
the necessary authorisation and conferral of powers is at the 
discretion of the national legislator. The language of the draft 
indicates that a piece of national legislation would be neces-
sary in this respect because, contrary to other instances (e.g. 
Art. 5(2)), the draft regulation does not refer to similarities 
with national rules or comparable domestic situations.
c)  Who is the recipient of the order?
The recipient of the order is a service provider offering ser-
vices in the Union and established or represented in another 
Member State. A service provider can be a natural or a le-
gal person and is otherwise defined by the services it offers, 
which, according to Art. 2 (3), can be: 
 Electronic communication services;
 Information society services;
 Internet domain name and IP numbering services.
These categories are explained in more detail in the Explana-
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tory Memorandum and use also references to other acts. In 
practice, the first two categories (electronic communication 
services and information society services) comprise such ser-
vices as Skype, WhatsApp, Amazon, Dropbox and mailing 
services.8 As to the last category of the definition of service 
providers (Internet domain name and IP numbering services), 
the Explanatory Memorandum makes reference to the provid-
ers of Internet infrastructure services that hold data potentially 
of high relevance in identifying the suspect.9 
Another requirement is that providers of the services de-
scribed above fall within the scope only if they are offering 
services in the Union and are established or represented in 
another Member State. These terms are further explained in 
the Directive itself (Art. 2(4)) and in the Explanatory Memo-
randum.10 Mere accessibility of the service from the territory 
of the European Union cannot be a sufficient criterion, as 
this would cause every provider in the world to fall within 
the scope. Furthermore, the service provider has to be es-
tablished or represented in another EU Member State, since 
otherwise there would be a purely domestic situation, which 
is excluded from the scope. 
An EPdO or an EPsO should be addressed directly to a le-
gal representative that the service provider shall designate for 
the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings 
(Art. 7(1)). The efficiency of this approach is supported by the 
proposed Directive (see below 2.) and alternative addressees 
if such a representative is not designated (cf. Art. 7(2)–(4)). 
d)  Under what conditions may the order be issued?
The draft regulation provides for a set of common conditions 
for issuing EPdOs and EPsOs as well as specific conditions for 
each of them. The first common condition is that the order may 
be issued only for criminal proceedings, which includes the 
pre-trial and the trial phase (Art. 3(2)). According to Art. 3(2), 
the order may also be issued in proceedings against legal per-
sons, where these persons may be held liable or punished. This 
formulation excludes any sort of double criminality require-
ment in this respect: even if the executing Member State does 
not provide for criminal liability of legal persons, the order 
still needs to be executed.
The second condition applicable to both orders refers to ne-
cessity and proportionality. The draft regulation distinguishes, 
however, between the two types of orders if it comes to the 
reference point of the evaluative criteria, which is founded in 
the different objectives of these instruments. The EPdO must 
be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the crimi-
nal proceedings in question (Art. 5(2)). By contrast, the EPsO 
must be necessary and proportionate to prevent the removal, 
deletion or alteration of data in view of a subsequent mutual 
legal assistance request, a European Investigation Order or an 
EPdO (Art. 6 (2)).
Two additional conditions limit the issuing of an EPdO, both 
referring to the national law of the issuing Member State. 
First, a similar measure must be available for the same crimi-
nal offence in a comparable domestic situation. This excludes 
the use of the EPdO in an issuing Member State that does not 
provide for such a measure in this context, thus limiting the 
harmonising effect of the regulation and positioning the ap-
plicability of the EPdO within the realm of national law. This 
limiting effect must, however, be relativized: firstly, the limi-
tation affects the power of the national authority, but not the 
foreign one. Secondly, the formulation does not state that the 
condition of application must be identical.
A second additional condition foresees that the application of 
the EPdO is also limited depending on the type of data and 
the type of offence in question. In case of subscriber or ac-
cess data, the issuance of an EPdO is allowed for any crimi-
nal offence, whereas the issuing of an EPdO for transactional 
or content data is limited to two groups of offences. The first 
group refers to the national law: the EPdO may be issued 
for “offences punishable in the issuing State by a custodial 
sentence of a maximum of at least 3 years.” The second one 
makes reference to framework decisions and directives (which 
harmonised substantive criminal law in specific fields) and 
allow national authorities to issue an EPdO regardless of the 
severity of punishment on the national level in the following 
cases:
 Fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment;
 Sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography;
 Attacks against information systems;
 Terrorism.
e)  Execution
The EPdO or EPsO will be transmitted to the recipient through 
certificates.11 The certificates are to be issued according to the 
models annexed to the draft regulation (Annex I and II). Some 
flexibility is granted as far as the transmission of the certificate 
is concerned. Any means are acceptable provided that they are 
capable of producing a written record and allow to establish 
the authenticity of the certificate (Art. 8).
Tight deadlines are foreseen for the execution of the orders 
(Art. 9). As far as the EPdO is concerned, the draft distinguish-
es as follows: in regular cases, the service provider should 
transmit the data to the issuing authority at the latest within 10 
days from the moment of receiving the certificate. In emergen-
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
216 |  eucrim   4 / 2018
cy cases, which are defined as an “imminent threat to life or 
physical integrity of a person or to a critical infrastructure,”12 
this deadline is brought down to 6 hours. An EPsO has to be 
executed without “undue delay”.
f)  Enforcement
In order to guarantee the practical effectiveness of the instru-
ment, while taking into account potential reservations and 
constraints on the side of the service provider or other affected 
persons, the regulation provides for a set of procedures and 
tools, some of which are prescribed by the regulation itself, 
and some of which require intervention on the part of the na-
tional legislator. On the one hand, in order to accommodate 
the interests of the service providers, the regulation provides 
for instruments of dialogue13 between law enforcement and 
service providers in addition to remedies for the latter, the sus-
pects and accused persons as well as for other persons whose 
data were obtained. On the other hand, in order to guarantee 
effectiveness of the measures, there are procedures for en-
forcement which engage authorities in the executing Member 
State and eventually pecuniary sanctions.
After receiving the order, the service provider would have to 
perform a check of the order. The draft regulation provides 
this as a right, but on many occasions the check will instead 
be a duty because of the contractual relationship with the user 
or data protection rules. According to the draft, there are three 
groups of reasons which may create difficulties for the service 
provider to comply with the order and for which the regula-
tion provides ways of remedying the situation. The objections 
shall be transmitted to the issuing authority by using a stand-
ard form (annexed to the draft regulation). 
The first group of reasons concerns the situation when the or-
der is incomplete, contains manifest errors or does not con-
tain sufficient information to execute. In this case, the service 
provider may ask for clarification. The reasons of the second 
group arise if the service provider is unable to execute the 
order because of force majeure or de facto impossibility, e.g. 
either because the order does not concern their customer or 
because the data has been deleted already. If the issuing au-
thority confirms the objection, it shall withdraw the order. The 
third group of reasons is described as “other”. So, for any other 
reason that the service provider does not provide the requested 
data within the deadline or does not provide it exhaustively, it 
shall also send the annex to the issuing authority explaining 
the reasons for failing to provide the data. The only potential 
consequence of this action is that the issuing authority shall re-
view the order and, if necessary, set a new deadline. This does 
not seem to oblige the authority to withdraw the order even if 
there is good reason to do so. 
If the addressee does not comply with the order and the 
above dialogue procedure does not cause the issuing author-
ity to accept the reasons provided, the issuing authority may 
transfer the order to the competent authority in the execut-
ing Member State. This transforms the procedure into a more 
traditional mutual recognition process: the enforcing author-
ity should recognise the order, except if there are grounds to 
oppose, which are enumerated in Art. 14(4) or (5), immunity 
or privilege under national law, or if its disclosure may im-
pact its fundamental interests such as national security and 
defence.
So far, the above rules apply to both types of orders (EPdO 
and EPsO). The draft regulation provides, however, an ad-
ditional reason for the service provider not to provide infor-
mation if it comes to the EPdO. This reason is an example of 
the above-mentioned “other” reasons and refers to an EPdO 
that “cannot be executed because based on the sole informa-
tion contained in the [order] it is apparent that it manifestly 
violates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union or that it is manifestly abusive.” In this case, the ser-
vice provider must send the respective annex to the enforce-
ment authority in the Member State of the addressee. The 
latter authority may then seek clarification from the issuing 
authority, including through Eurojust or the European Judi-
cial Network.
The impact of this rule is problematic. While it seemingly 
concerns a fundamental question – a significant abuse − it 
seems only procedural in nature: it requests that another au-
thority be informed, an authority which may be potentially 
involved if the enforcement is needed. How should this fun-
damental rights clause be construed? Should it be read as 
if the violation or abuse is not manifest, it is not a ground 
to object? Or should it merely be read as saying, that if the 
violation or abuse is not manifest, the other authority should 
not receive the annex at this stage? If this provision is read 
together with the enforcement part, one notices that the ex-
ecuting state authority cannot oppose the execution of the 
order if it finds that it violates the Charter or that it is abusive, 
unless the violation/abuse is manifest. It results from this 
interpretation that, without the fulfilment of this adverbial 
condition (“manifestly”), the abuse or violation have no rel-
evance and the execution of the EPdO would be obligatory. 
This is a highly questionable outcome. In addition, the Ex-
planatory Memorandum does not explain how to interpret the 
word “manifest,” which usually means “obvious” or “clearly 
apparent.” Yet, an abuse is an abuse irrespective of whether 
it is visible prima facie or not. If the court in the executing 
member state reveals its abusiveness, why should it not be 
allowed to oppose the order just because it was not possible 
to spot it prima facie?
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g)  Sanctions and remedies
The draft regulation contains provisions on sanctions (Art. 13) 
and remedies (Arts. 15–17), although these are relatively re-
strained, making mostly reference to national law. The Mem-
ber States are also obliged to put in place provisions on pecu-
niary sanctions applicable to service providers in the event of 
infringements of their duties (as described above). While the 
sanctions do not need to be of a criminal nature, they have to 
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The proposal does 
not clarify who shall impose a sanction and who should en-
force it. It is also not clear whether good reasons to refuse pro-
viding information on the part of the service provider, such as 
a (non-manifest) violation of the Charter or a (non-manifest) 
abuse of the order (see f) above), may be taken into account in 
the process of imposing such sanctions. 
The draft regulation further contains a chapter entitled “Rem-
edies”, which complements the measures described above and 
grants rights not only to the service providers, but also to sus-
pects and accused persons as well as other persons whose data 
were obtained. Except for the service providers, the remedies 
concerning all the other persons are to be provided by national 
law. Such right to an effective remedy shall be exercised be-
fore a court in the issuing state and must offer the possibility 
to challenge the legality of the measure, including its necessity 
and proportionality. The issuing authority is also responsible 
for informing the interested persons about that right (Art. 17). 
Within this framework these persons should be able to address 
issues of violation of the Charter or the abuse of the order.
It should also be underlined, that Art. 1(2) of the draft regula-
tion contains the same clause as Art. 1(3) of the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, which has recently 
resulted in cases where the execution of the EAW was put under 
question or refused because of fundamental rights concerns.14 It 
cannot be excluded that the clause could result in similar ques-
tioning of the orders based on the same or similar concerns.
The service providers’ right to remedy is limited to conflicts of 
laws and affects only the EPdO. This remedy is meant to take 
into account situations in which the service provider would 
find itself in a situation where the order obliges it to provide 
information although the applicable law of a third country 
prohibits it. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this 
approach should also encourage non-EU countries to respect 
the limitations that the providers falling into the scope of this 
regulation face, in particular as regards fundamental rights 
concerns, including data protection.15 The remedy applies if 
compliance with the EPdO would result in a conflict with the 
applicable law of a third country prohibiting disclosure of the 
data concerned:
 On the grounds that this is necessary to either protect the 
fundamental rights of the individuals concerned or the fun-
damental interests of the third country in relation to national 
security or defence (Art. 15); 
 On other grounds (Art. 16).
It is expressly stated that the conflict cannot be based just on 
the lack of a similar procedure in the third country or on the 
fact that the data is stored in that country. The service provider 
shall inform the issuing authority about the existence of the 
conflict. If the issuing authority intends to uphold the EPdO, 
it shall request a review by the competent court in the issuing 
Member State. The court shall verify if the law of the third 
country applies and if it is so, whether the service provider is 
prohibited from disclosing the information. The verification 
can have several consequences:
 If the court finds no relevant conflicts of law, it shall uphold 
the order;
 If the court finds that there is a conflict because of “other 
grounds,” the court lifting of the order is not mandatory. 
The court must (only) consider the conflict when evaluating 
a number of criteria specified in Art. 16(5) that are based on 
the requirements of data protection, investigation and the 
addressee’s interests; 
 If the conflict is grounded in the protection of the funda-
mental rights of the individuals concerned or of the funda-
mental interests of the third country in relation to its nation-
al security or defence, a central authority of the third state 
is engaged. This authority shall respond within 15 days (a 
deadline that may be extended upon request from that au-
thority), whether it objects to the execution of the EPdO. 
Such an objection obliges the court in the issuing state to 
lift the order. Lack of response of the authority results in 
a reminder with a five days deadline and if that brings no 
reaction, the order shall be upheld. It is worth noticing that 
the authority in the third state is not obliged to comply with 
the deadlines. While questions of national security or de-
fence may be a sufficient motivation for the authority to 
comply with the deadline, the protection of fundamental 
rights may not in all cases. Then, such an authority in the 
third country may only be motivated by comity or by the 
will to protect the service provider because of its connec-
tion with the third state.
2.  Draft Directive
The draft directive obliges the Member States to set up rules 
ensuring that service providers offering services in the Euro-
pean Union designate at least one legal representative in the 
Union empowered to receive and respond to the orders de-
scribed in the regulation. In order for the regulation to be ef-
fective, it is crucial that the name of such representative is 
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made known, also in view of relatively short deadlines that the 
regulation imposes for the execution of the orders. 
Some Member States have already created such obligations 
– at the national level – to nominate a service provider’s repre-
sentative. This action is, however, in conflict with the internal 
market logic: imposing mandatory legal representation within 
the territory of a Member State is in conflict with the free-
dom of services within the internal market.16 Therefore, the 
directive aims not only to assure the possibility of an effective 
enforcement of the EPdO and EPsO, but also to avoid the risk 
that other Member States launch further unilateral initiatives 
in this regard, creating divergent legal frameworks and further 
obstacles to the internal market. Hence, the directive is issued 
on an internal market legal basis, which is explained by its 
aim. While the problem described affects the service providers 
that are not established in a Member State in question, it does 
not exist if they have already been established. As a conse-
quence, and similarly to the draft regulation, the directive does 
not affect service providers offering services exclusively in the 
territory of one EU Member State.
The obligation to “designate at least one legal representative 
in the Union for the receipt of, compliance with and enforce-
ment of decision and order issued by competent authorities of 
Member States for the purpose of gathering evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings” concerns service providers established in the 
European Union as well as those that are not established in 
the Union, but offering services in the territory of the Member 
States concerned (Art. 3 (1) and (2) of the draft Directive). 
The latter means that such a service provider should have a 
substantial connection to the Member State. The meaning of 
substantial connection is the same as for the draft regulation 
(see above 1c).17 In order to guarantee the fulfilment of these 
duties, the Member States should also provide for effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applicable for infringe-
ments of these duties and make sure that they are implemented 
(Art. 5).
III.  Next Steps
The Commission’s proposal has already been subject to some 
analysis at the request of the European Parliament18 as well as 
by the academic community,19 civil society20 and industry.21 
The Council as well as the European Parliament have been dis-
cussing the proposal for the regulation. The Council reached 
an agreement on 7 December 2018 proposing a number of 
amendments to the Commission’s draft.22 The following are 
among the most important amendments:
 Including into the scope of application of the regulation that 
an order may also be issued for the purpose of the execution 
of custodial sentences or detention orders (with exceptions) 
(Art. 3);
 Deleting the subsection on orders being manifestly abusive 
or manifestly violating fundamental rights (Art. 9(5));
 Adding to the provision on sanctions that pecuniary sanc-
tions − of up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover 
of the service provider’s preceding financial year − can be 
imposed (Art. 13);
 Abolishing the differentiation between the two remedies for 
service providers regarding a conflict of law; according to 
the new design, the mandatory opinion of the authority of 
the third country is abolished, and only seeking information 
from that authority is allowed; it is not obligatory to lift the 
order, regardless of the conflict of law (Arts. 15 and 16);
 Adding for the EPdOs concerning content data a procedure 
requesting notification of the authority of the enforcing 
Member State if there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person whose data is sought is not residing in the 
territory of the issuing Member State; this procedure, which 
was one of the major issues discussed in the Council, is 
meant to safeguard rights stemming from immunities and 
privileges (new Art. 7a);23 
 Including the speciality principle providing limitations on 
the use of electronic evidence other than for the purpose of 
the proceedings for which it was obtained and its transmis-
sion to another Member State, third country or international 
organisation (new Art. 12b).
Following these conclusions, the Council is ready to start the 
trilogue negotiations with the European Parliament. Yet, work 
on the Directive is still ongoing within the Council, which 
hopes to reach an agreement under the Romanian Presiden-
cy.24 As to the regulation, the Parliament still has to agree on 
its position, which is being prepared first and foremost by the 
LIBE Committee. The committee requested two reports25 and 
held a public hearing on 27 November 2018, while the des-
ignated rapporteur issued a working document, which should 
help steer further discussion.26 It is difficult to predict whether 
the agreement can be achieved before the end of the parlia-
mentary term, given the number of critical voices within the 
Parliament and also the fair number of reservations on the part 
of Member States that were expressed during the discussions 
in the Council.27 
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Unpacking the CLOUD Act
Jennifer Daskal
This article seeks to demystify the recently enacted Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, enacted in March 
2018 by the U.S. government in an effort to address challenges faced by law enforcement in accessing data located across bor-
ders. It explains the two parts of the act, dealing with: (i) U.S. access to data located outside the United States; and (ii) foreign 
government access to data held by U.S. companies within the United States. As the article highlights, the CLOUD Act offers a 
model for both responding to law enforcement needs and setting – and raising – baseline privacy protections. In that regard, it 
is a step in the right direction, although there is much more work to be done. 
I.  Introduction
In March 2018, the United States enacted the Clarifying Law-
ful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, mooting a pending 
Supreme Court case, detailing the reach of U.S. law enforce-
ment authority over extraterritorially located data, and setting 
out a mechanism for foreign governments to gain expedited 
access to U.S.-held data in specified circumstances.1
The Act has generated controversy both within and outside 
the United States. Critics described it as having been “rushed” 
through Congress at the expense of privacy and civil liberties.2 
Others decried the “expansion of US enforcement power.”3 
But, as this article explains, the rhetoric does not match the 
reality. 
That said, there remain key, unresolved issues that need to be 
worked out, both by U.S. courts and in coordination with for-
eign partners in Europe and elsewhere; how these issues are re-
solved will go a long way towards determining the effectiveness 
of the Act as well as its effect on both privacy and security.
It is true that the legislation was tacked onto an omnibus 
spending bill at the 11th hour. But it was not the surprise that 
some have suggested. On the contrary, key elements had been 
the subject of hearings in both the House and Senate judici-
ary committees and in multiple other open, informal congres-
sional briefings.4 What ultimately became Part II of the Act 
was something that had been actively pursued by the Obama 
administration and ultimately also supported by the Trump ad-
ministration. Tech companies, law enforcement officials, aca-
demic experts, and members of civil society were involved in 
a multi-year discussion of the issues; many representatives ac-
tively lobbied members of Congress both for and against key 
provisions.5 An earlier version of the CLOUD Act had been 
previously proposed as a stand-alone bill.6
Moreover, whereas much of civil society argued − both before 
and after − the Act’s passage that the baseline protections in-
cluded in the second part of the Act do not sufficiently protect 
privacy and civil liberties, those baseline requirements are a 
floor − not a ceiling. Specifically, the Act authorizes the ex-
ecutive branch of the United States to enter into agreements 
with foreign governments, pursuant to which foreign govern-
ments can gain expedited access to U.S.-held data. In so do-
ing, it sets out the minimal requirements that each and every 
agreement must meet. The envisioned agreements also impose 
a number of use-based limitations, mandating, for example, 
the secure storage of any disclosed data, deletion or segrega-
tion of non-relevant information, and limits on when the data 
can be shared. They also require that foreign partners agree to 
periodic reviews to ensure that the requirements are met. 
In many areas, even these minimal requirements are more ro-
bust than what would be required if governments were able to 
compel the production of sought-after communications con-
tent pursuant to their existing domestic rules; this provides an 
incentive for governments to raise standards to meet the mini-
mal requirements – an incentive that will ultimately enhance 
privacy protections above and beyond the status quo. 
In addition, the first part of the Act, which clarifies the reach 
of US law enforcement over extraterritorially held data, is 
neither the kind of sea change nor the enforcement grab that 
some have suggested.7 Prior to December 2013, when Micro-
soft first challenged a U.S.-issued warrant based on the fact 
that the sought-after data was located outside the territorial 
borders of the United States, providers regularly responded to 
U.S.-issued disclosure orders without regard to the location of 
the data being sought. A company like Google operates what 
has been called by a “data shard” model,8 referring to the fact 
which the data of even a single account is sometimes broken 
up and moved from place to place, in many cases across inter-
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national borders, for reasons of performance and efficiency. 
. As of 2017, Google did not have a mechanism in place to 
ascertain where all of its data was located at any given point 
in time.9 It only developed the tools to ascertain data location 
when, as a result of court rulings, it was required to do so. 
As with all legislation, the CLOUD Act was the product of 
negotiated compromise; it is, as a result, inherently imper-
fect. Among other flaws, it does not contemplate the pos-
sibility of multilateral agreements, thereby leaving unre-
solved key questions about the possibility and contours of a 
potential US-EU agreement;10 adopts a new conflict-of-law 
provision yet only applies it in very limited circumstances; 
fails to tackle the critically important issue of user notice; 
and neglects to provide explicit protection for companies 
that seek to provide transparency over foreign government 
requests for data, But it also reflects a much-needed attempt 
to respond to the changing needs of law enforcement, es-
tablish new mechanisms to address these needs, and lay out 
minimal substantive and procedural standards to govern law 
enforcement in the process. In so doing, it responds to three 
emerging realities:
 The increased digitalization of information; 
 The power of third-party private companies that manage 
and control so much of that data; 
 The increased internationalization of investigations, with 
either the data of interest or the provider that controls that 
data located across an international border.
As just one measure of these developments, a recent Euro-
pean Commission report found that law enforcement sought 
data held by extraterritorially-located service providers in 
over 55% of EU law enforcement investigations.11 In many 
cases, that jurisdiction is the United States − a reality that the 
CLOUD Act tries, in part, to deal with. The first section of 
this article seeks to move past the rhetoric and demystify the 
CLOUD Act by explaining and analysing its two key parts. 
The second section highlights some of the key issues left to 
be resolved. 
II.  Unpacking the CLOUD Act
The CLOUD Act contains two key parts. Part I clarifies the 
reach of US law enforcement to access data held extraterritori-
ally by US-based providers. Part II authorizes the executive to 
enter into agreements with foreign governments, pursuant to 
which foreign governments can bypass the otherwise applica-
ble mutual legal assistance requirements in specified circum-
stances and according to baseline substantive and procedural 
requirements. The next two subsections provide details on 
each of these two parts.
1.  The reach of US law enforcement
Just one month before the CLOUD Act’s enactment, the Su-
preme Court heard oral arguments in what is often referred 
to as the Microsoft Ireland case. The case dates back to De-
cember 2013, when Microsoft was served with a warrant for 
emails, pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), as 
part of a drug-related criminal investigation. The sought-after 
emails were stored in Dublin, Ireland, and Microsoft refused 
to comply with the warrant as a result. According to Microsoft, 
warrants issued pursuant to the SCA are territorially limited 
and thus only could compel the production of data that was 
stored within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
The U.S. government acknowledged that the warrants author-
ized by the SCA do not have extraterritorial effect. But it em-
phasized that Microsoft was a U.S.-based company that could 
access and control the data from within the United States. Ac-
cording to the U.S. government, the fact that the particular 0s 
and 1s were located outside the United States did not matter. 
What mattered was the location of access and disclosure − all 
within the territory of the United States. 
In sum, both parties agreed that warrants issued under the 
SCA are territorially limited. But they strongly disagreed as 
to whether or a warrant issued on a U.S-located company for 
data located outside the United States was a territorial or ex-
traterritorial exercise of the warrant authority. To resolve this 
dispute, the justices needed to identify the intent behind, and 
thus focus of, the SCA − a 30-plus-year-old statute that did not 
directly address the question posed. At the oral argument, sev-
eral justices suggested that this was an issue better dealt with 
by Congress than the courts.12 
And in fact, Congress stepped in just one month later, passed 
the CLOUD Act and answered the key unresolved question, 
and thereby mooted the Supreme Court case. 
Consistent with the government’s position in the case, the 
CLOUD Act specifies that providers are, in response to law-
ful process, required to disclose responsive communications 
content within their possession, custody, or control, regardless 
of the location of that data.13 But Congress also recognized the 
risk of conflicts with foreign law, particularly in situations in 
which the request seeks extraterritorially held data of a foreign 
national. It thus created a new statutory basis for providers 
to move to quash based on a conflict with foreign law, albeit 
only in those limited circumstances in which the conflict is 
with a “qualifying foreign government” and the United States 
seeks the data of a non-U.S. person located outside the United 
States.14 To become a qualifying foreign government, the gov-
ernment must have entered into an executive agreement with 
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the United States as authorized pursuant to Part II of the Act. 
To date, there are zero such qualifying governments although 
that is likely to change over time as will be described below.15 
Congress further noted the possibility that separate comity 
claims could be considered under “common law” standards in 
those circumstance in which statutory provision does not ap-
ply.16 This would arise if, for example, a provider alleged that 
a compelled disclosure order conflicted with foreign law pro-
hibiting such disclosure. Courts would then be in a position of 
weighing the relevant equities in deciding whether to continue 
to compel disclosure of the sought-after data. Notably, these 
kinds of claims could be made before and after the CLOUD 
Act’s enactment; the CLOUD Act merely notes a continuation 
of the status quo. That said, Congress’s explicit recognition of 
the need for courts to address legal conflicts gives credibility 
to such claims if and when they do arise.
As far as is known, no such claims of conflict in response to 
the issuance of U.S. warrants have yet been raised.17 Even in 
the Microsoft Ireland case, neither Microsoft nor Ireland as-
serted a direct conflict of law. In its amicus brief to the Su-
preme Court, Ireland emphasized that it was willing and ready 
to respond to a mutual legal assistance request for the sought-
after data. But it never actually asserted that Microsoft would 
violate Irish law if it were compelled to disclose the data.18 
That said, such conflicts are likely to emerge over time, given, 
in particular, transfer restrictions included in the EU’s General 
Data Protection Regulation and as discussed below.19 
2.  Foreign law enforcement to U.S.-held data
Part II of the CLOUD Act responds to the converse problem 
foreign governments face with respect to their ability to ac-
cess communications content held by U.S. service provid-
ers. The same statute at issue in Microsoft Ireland, namely 
the SCA, blocks US-based providers from disclosing com-
munications content to foreign law enforcement. Instead, 
foreign law enforcement authorities are required to make a 
government-to-government mutual legal assistance request 
for such data, even if they are seeking the data of one of their 
own citizens or residents in connection with a local crime. 
This is a time-consuming process involving a Department of 
Justice review of the request, a U.S. attorney’s office going 
to court to obtain a warrant on behalf of the foreign govern-
ment, and a subsequent review by the Department of Justice 
before the data is ultimately disclosed.20 A 2013 report found 
that it took an average of ten months for the U.S. government 
to respond, even in those situations in which it agreed to turn 
over the data.21
Foreign governments are increasingly frustrated by this real-
ity, given, in particular, the fact that US-based companies con-
trol such a significant quantity of the world’s data and given 
the ways in which these requirements thwart the efforts to 
swiftly and efficiently investigate crime. Paddy McGuiness, 
the UK’s former Deputy National Security Advisor, twice tes-
tified before the U.S. Congress about the ways in which the 
provisions blocking direct disclosures to foreign law enforce-
ment were hampering the U.K.’s ability to investigate and pre-
vent crime.22 
To address these concerns, Congress authorized the execu-
tive branch to enter into agreements with foreign govern-
ments, pursuant to which the partner government could 
directly request communications content from U.S.-based 
providers, subject to specified requirements, without hav-
ing to employ the mutual legal assistance process. In order 
to be eligible, the foreign government must first be certified 
by the Attorney General, in conjunction with the Secretary 
of State, as “afford[ing] robust substantive and procedural 
protections for privacy and civil liberties.”23 Each individu-
al request must also meet specified requirements, including 
those that the requests be particularized, in compliance with 
the foreign government’s domestic law, based on “articula-
ble and credible facts” and subject to review or oversight by 
a court, judge, or magistrate or other independent authority 
of the requesting foreign government.24 Requests must be 
limited to “serious crimes.”25
Congress also anticipated the possibility that, pursuant to such 
agreements, foreign governments could seek live intercepts − 
and not just stored communications. For live intercepts, the 
legislation includes the additional requirements that the orders 
be time-limited, lasting no longer than is needed to accomplish 
the approved objectives, and subject to a finding that the same 
information “could not reasonably be obtained by another less 
intrusive method.”26
The agreements also include a number of requirements as to 
use of collected data. The data must be stored on a “secure 
system” accessible only to those “trained in applicable pro-
cedures.”27 The foreign government is required to segregate, 
seal, or delete non-relevant information.28 In addition, the 
foreign government must agree to periodic reviews by the 
United States government to ensure that the provisions of 
the executive agreement are being followed.29 Whereas some 
such use-based limitations and accountability provisions 
were already included in the EU-US Umbrella Agreement, 
which covers law enforcement sharing across the Atlantic, 
these provisions include additional specifics that will help 
to protect the security and privacy of shared data.30 Further-
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more, for countries outside the EU that are not subject to the 
Umbrella Agreement, they represent a significant increase in 
protection compared to the status quo under the current mu-
tual legal assistance process, where the U.S. government has 
minimal say as to how data is handled once it is provided to 
a foreign government.
Notably, the agreements also only permit foreign government 
direct access to the data of non-U.S. persons located outside 
the United States. Thus, even with an executive agreement in 
place, partner governments cannot directly compel the pro-
duction of a U.S. person’s (defined to include U.S. citizens 
and legal permanent residents)31 communications content or 
the communications content of non-U.S. citizens physically 
located in the United States; these requests still need to go 
through the mutual legal assistance system.32 In other words, 
partner foreign governments can directly access foreigners’ 
data and hence set the rules, albeit with a number of baseline 
requirements in place, concerning access to that data. But if 
they want access to U.S. citizen and resident data, they still 
need to get U.S. court approval based on the U.S. standard of 
probable cause. 
Finally, the foreign government must provide “reciprocal 
rights of data access.” This means that the foreign government 
must permit its own locally based providers to respond direct-
ly to U.S. requests for data if and when the United States is 
seeking the data of a non-national of the partner government, 
has issued valid legal process to the provider, and has jurisdic-
tion to compel such production.33
III.  Open Questions
The CLOUD Act is still new, leaving key questions as to im-
plementation and interpretation to be worked out. Despite 
the warnings that Part I would lead to widespread conflicts 
of law, no such claims have yet been raised, although some 
may emerge in the near future. Of particular relevance, the 
EU’s newly implemented General Data Protection Regula-
tion includes key limitations on when EU-held data can be 
transferred out of the EU.34 Some have argued that, in the ab-
sence of a new international agreement explicitly providing 
for transfers in these situations, no currently applicable excep-
tion would permit transfers of EU residents’ data to the United 
States outside of the mutual legal assistance process, even in 
response to a validly U.S.-issued warrant.35 The European 
Commission’s amicus brief to the Supreme Court was non-
committal on this point.36 In the absence of an explicit EU-US 
agreement providing the basis for such transfers, conflicts may 
very well occur, with litigation to ensue.37
Meanwhile, no executive agreements have yet been entered 
into (and hence there are no “qualifying countries” for pur-
poses of Part I of the CLOUD Act), although there are expec-
tations that a U.S.-UK agreement will be forthcoming. Either 
a U.S.-EU framework agreement or agreements with specific 
EU countries may be next. These initial agreements are likely 
to become a model for those that follow.
Importantly, and as noted in the Introduction of this article, the 
statutorily specified requirements for executive agreements 
merely set a floor not a ceiling. Additional protections can, 
and in some cases should, be added to any agreements that are 
ultimately adopted. Among the key additional provisions to be 
included: 38 
 An agreed-upon mechanism for providers to initiate a U.S.-
government review mechanism if and when they have con-
cerns about a foreign government request; 
 Protections for providers that produce transparency reports 
with details about foreign government requests for data; 
 Clear rules on whether, when, and in what circumstances 
notification to the target of the collection is required and 
when and for what reasons it can be delayed.
Use-based requirements also provide an opportunity to incor-
porate protections in new and innovative ways. The required 
limitations on access, dissemination, and retention should be 
robustly implemented and followed. Periodic reviews should 
be regular and meaningful to ensure effective prevention and 
rapid correction of any errors or abuse. 
A range of other details still needs to be worked out, includ-
ing the scope of free speech protections and the set of “seri-
ous crimes” to be covered by the agreements. Each and eve-
ry agreement also will need to address issues of scope. The 
CLOUD Act, for example, authorizes agreements that cover 
both stored communications and live intercepts. But there is 
no requirement that agreements do, in fact, encompass both. In 
fact, there is no basis in U.S. law to issue a wiretap order with 
extraterritorial reach.39 It is thus possible to design agreements 
that allow for direct production of stored communications but 
do not include wiretaps. 
In order to facilitate both compliance and oversight, partner 
countries might consider channelling all applicable cross-border 
requests through specified points of contact to ensure that speci-
fied protections are met. This is also something that the United 
States might require in certain circumstances. It also would help 
facilitate the periodic reviews and accountability that the agree-
ments require. Each of these determinations can and should 
be worked out as part of an ongoing dialogue with the United 
States and key stakeholders from both industry and civil society. 
The considerations outlined here are just some of many.
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IV.  Conclusion
The CLOUD Act represents the opening salvo in a much-
needed dialogue about the substantive and procedural rules 
governing law enforcement access to digital evidence and 
the shifting relationship between territorial boundaries and 
evidentiary needs. It is just one of many initiatives being pur-
sued because of shifting trends in the ways key evidence is 
managed and stored. The European Union’s draft e-Evidence 
proposals, unveiled in April 2018,40 represent Europe’s con-
tribution to this discussion and bear remarkable similarities to 
the CLOUD Act. 
Akin to Part II of the CLOUD Act, the draft E-Evidence Regu-
lation provides a mechanism for law enforcement in an inves-
tigating country to bypass the mutual legal assistance process 
and issue a disclosure order directly to a private company that 
holds evidence of interest, even if that private company is lo-
cated outside the investigating country’s territorial jurisdic-
tion. 
Other unilateral initiatives abound. As a result of recent legis-
lative changes, the UK now authorizes the issuance of extra-
territorial warrants. Australia recently enacted legislation that 
would authorize the issuance of technical assistance orders on 
extraterritorially-located providers that have one or more end 
users in Australia.41 In specific court cases, Belgian authorities 
have maintained their authority to compel the production of 
data held by foreign-based providers offering services within 
Belgium, even if they are not located there.42 
These initiatives seek to respond to the increasing digitaliza-
tion of information, the role of third-party providers in control-
ling this information, and the fact that providers and data of 
interest are increasingly held across borders. These shifts pro-
vide opportunities as much as they create challenges. The U.S. 
CLOUD Act is an important contribution to these efforts – one 
that can and should be built on via the construction of robust 
bilateral agreements that protect and elevate privacy and civil 
liberties while at the same time facilitating lawful access in 
ways that help protect and promote security.
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Classification of Electronic Data  
for Criminal Law Purposes
Claudia Warken
Although the significance of electronic evidence for criminal investigations of any type of criminal offence has been steadily 
growing for years, respective legal frameworks in all EU Member States are only fragmented – if they exist at all. There is an 
urgent need for comprehensive legislation that takes into account the various grades of data sensitivity. For various reasons, 
the common distinction between subscriber data, traffic data, and content data is not suitable for this purpose. Instead, a new 
classification is necessary. The article analyzes the relevant backgrounds and provides an overview of the current issues. 
More importantly, it proposes a new classification with five categories of electronic data. The key criterion for determining the 
sensitivity of a dataset − the data subject’s reasonable expectation of confidentiality – allows a distinction as follows: (1) data 
of core significance for private life, (2) secret data, (3) shared confidential data, (4) data of limited accessibility, and (5) data 
of unlimited accessibility. The article further shows that the newly proposed classification is comprehensive and technically 
neutral − thus, future-proof. In addition, it explains why the approach presented is solidly based and most suitable for legisla-
tive purposes, since it derives solely from the specifically affected fundamental rights.
II.  Relevance of Electronic Data as Evidence –  
Specific Characteristics
Electronic data are increasingly relevant as evidence in crimi-
nal investigations. According to the common understanding, 
the term refers to any representation of facts, information, or 
concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer sys-
tem.3 These data play a significant role, e.g. where perpetrators 
communicate electronically or where the mere possession of 
an electronic device can provide location data for exact and 
specific times. In addition, it has been observed over the last 
few years that electronic data are not only relevant in the con-
text of classical cybercrimes such as DDoS hits or ransomware 
attacks but also in the context of traditional offenses, such as 
fraud or child sexual abuse, which are more and more fre-
quently committed through the internet. 
Furthermore, the rapidly expanding use of electronic devices, 
e.g. for work-related and private purposes, for mobile commu-
nication, or in the Internet of Things, where devices exchange 
information through the internet directly, has led to the phe-
nomena of Big Data – large amounts of information stored in 
electronic form and potentially relevant as evidence.
Electronic data for use as evidence in a criminal investigation 
can be obtained from the victim, the suspect, or any third party 
who, in most cases, is a service provider whose service refers 
to the creation, transmission, and/or storage of the data. Law 
enforcement can obtain the data through open or covert meas-
ures: A house search, including the seizure of electronic de-
I.  Theses1
Electronic data have become increasingly relevant as evidence 
in criminal investigations. Yet, there are – if any − only frag-
mented legal frameworks on European or national levels in the 
Member States of the European Union targeting the specific 
challenges posed by this unique type of evidence. Thus, there 
is a need for comprehensive and coherent legislative solutions 
on different levels.
The conditions and safeguards of different investigation meas-
ures depend on the intrusiveness of the respective measure. In 
the context of electronic data, the intrusiveness of a measure 
can vary widely. This has to be taken into account in the devel-
opment of any legislative approach by means of an appropriate 
classification of the data. The common distinction of commu-
nication data, generally resulting in a classification of content 
data and non-content data or content data, traffic data and user 
data, does not meet the requirements of modern legistics.2 The 
required classification has to reflect the sensitivity of specific 
types of electronic data. Thus, it should solely be based on the 
affected data subject’s fundamental rights. The key criterion 
for determining the sensitivity of a dataset is the data subject’s 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
It allows a classification as follows (in order of decreasing sen-
sitivity): data of core significance for private life, secret data, 
shared confidential data, data of limited accessibility, and data 
of unlimited accessibility. The following sections further dis-
cuss this statement.
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vices, such as a mobile phone or a laptop, is an example of an 
open investigation measure, while the interception of a mobile 
communication, for instance, is usually conducted in a covert 
way.
Because electronic data are intangible – they are nothing more 
than a processable sequence of zeros and ones −, they show 
characteristics that are not comparable to those of other, tangi-
ble evidence.4 In contrast to physical things, the handover of 
electronic data usually does not imply a loss of control; on the 
contrary, the data possessor usually keeps the original data-
set and only transfers a copy of it – either electronically, on a 
data storage device, or as a printout on paper. From a technical 
point of view, electronic data can generally be accessed (and 
thus be obtained) from anywhere in the world as long as they 
are accessible through the internet; the necessary act for their 
seizure does not have to take place at the concrete data loca-
tion. Concerning the acquisition of electronic data, time is a 
crucial factor, not only because this evidence can be transmit-
ted with literally nearly speed of light, but also because such 
transmission can be carried out irrespective of any national 
borders. Last but not least, compared to physical things, it is 
much easier to create and process electronic data anonymous-
ly; traces in the virtual cyberspace can be hidden much better.5 
Once law enforcement has obtained electronic data that are 
potential evidence, they usually have to be converted into a 
compatible, readable format for further processing. This im-
plies the risk of intentional, unintentional, and even unnoticed 
manipulation of the original information.
III.  Existing Legal Frameworks (Criminal Law)
Even though electronic data show unique characteristics that 
have a significant impact on their availability and admissibility 
as evidence, only a few legal frameworks exist and they take 
only some of the specifics into account. Even where specific 
legal provisions of criminal procedure exist, the legal land-
scape on European level as much as on national levels in the 
European Union, the USA, and other “Western” countries is 
fragmented. There is no comprehensive set of rules addressing 
these specific issues. Like in other EU countries, the German 
Code of Criminal Procedure,6 lacks explicit regulations, e.g. on 
the acquisition of electronic data from any third party who is 
not a telecommunication service provider,7 on the acquisition 
of machine-to-machine information, on preliminary measures 
for data preservation (“quick freeze”), on the handling of large 
amounts of Big Data, and on procedures to guarantee and 
confirm the integrity and authenticity of a dataset. As in other 
jurisdictions, existing provisions referring to tangible pieces 
of evidence are applied in order to fill gaps – a questionable 
approach in the sensitive area of criminal law.
Although there is a cross-border aspect in many cases refer-
ring to electronic evidence, it is often unclear how a provider 
who offers service in a country without having any physical 
assets there should be dealt with.8 It is also unclear whether 
a request for data disclosure should be served in the country 
where the service provider has its headquarters or, if different, 
rather in the country where the data are stored.9 Unsolved is-
sues of jurisdiction arise, e.g. if a multi-national botnet is used 
to commit a DDoS attack in one country, if several perpetra-
tors who are located in different jurisdictions act together, or if 
a number of victims in different countries are affected through 
one offense.10 In addition, the problem of “loss of location” − 
electronic data stored abroad and, at the same time, accessible 
from home − is being discussed controversially. 
The current general opinion seems to favor prohibiting the do-
mestic investigator from processing such data, due to the as-
sumed violation of the other state’s sovereignty that such an act 
would cause. The same seems to apply to the situation involving 
“loss of knowledge of location,” where it is not even clear where 
the data are located. Thus, they could well be stored domestically 
so that there would be no cross-border situation at all; still, the 
potential risk of violation of another country’s sovereignty would 
prevent the investigator from using these data.11 Preliminary 
cross-border data retention is regulated only between EU Mem-
ber States,12 and there are no comparable instruments concerning 
other countries. Last but not least, open questions remain when 
service providers who operate internationally find themselves 
in situations of conflicting law, e.g. when the disclosure of cer-
tain data is requested by one country and a compliant disclosure 
would violate another country’s data protection laws.
In a nutshell, there is a lack of legislation − both quantitative-
ly and qualitatively. Only recently, legislators have begun to 
tackle the issues, leading, for example, to the European Com-
mission’s proposal on access to electronic evidence in criminal 
investigations of April 201813 or to the Council of Europe’s 
current discussion on an additional protocol to the Conven-
tion on Cybercrime. On the national level, provisions allow-
ing remote evidence gathering through the internet have been 
introduced lately e.g. in Belgium, Germany and Austria while 
the US CLOUD Act of March 2018 specifically aims at data 
“in the cloud”. Still, these approaches cover only some of the 
problems. The lack of clear and reliable normative concepts in 
criminal investigations endanger legal certainty and jeopard-
ize the fundamental rights of affected persons.
IV.  General Legistic Requirements
The right of equal treatment is a fundamental right generally 
accepted in all modern “Western” legal frameworks. In the sim-
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plified words of the German Constitutional Court, it calls on the 
legislator and law enforcement to treat equal cases equally and 
unequal cases unequally unless there are reasonable grounds to 
deviate from this rule. Accordingly, deriving from the funda-
mental right of equal treatment and depending on the object of 
a concrete investigation measure, there is a general understand-
ing that different conditions and safeguards may apply. Thus, 
the search of a home follows different rules than one for a bag 
on the street, even though both objects are physical things that 
belong to an individual. Obviously, the search of a home and 
that of a bag on the street are considered unequal cases be-
cause the intrusiveness, e.g. regarding the fundamental right of 
privacy, is higher in the first scenario than in the second one. 
This example indicates that the level of interference with the 
respective fundamental right(s) is an appropriate criterion by 
which to group and to distinguish cases or, in other words, to 
determine whether cases are equal or unequal.
That is nicely said, yet it provokes the next question of how 
the level of interference with fundamental rights is determined 
or, in other words, what the appropriate criteria for the differ-
entiation are. Why exactly is a home considered more private 
than a bag on the street? What is the concrete reason for this 
legal distinction? Many national constitutions even ban certain 
aspects as distinguishing features at all.14 Outside this banned 
scope, there are many possible options at the discretion of the 
legislator. 
V.  Classifying Electronic Data – Traditional Approach
Consensus exists that there is a wide range of potential in-
terference with fundamental rights through the acquisition 
and the use of electronic data in a criminal investigation. It 
is further commonly agreed that this broad range of potential 
intrusiveness calls for a set of possible measures with different 
conditions and safeguards. As referred to above, for instance, 
acquiring the content of the mobile communication of a lawyer 
and his/her client is legally not equal to acquiring the content 
of a communication in an open internet chat; the first example 
is considered much more sensitive than the second one. There 
are many more examples which reflect the general assumption 
that the sensitivity of one dataset is not always identical to the 
one of another dataset – even if both could be grouped, for ex-
ample, as personal communication content information. Cases 
differ; they may be unequal.
In addition, there are apparently no reasonable grounds for 
treating the unequal cases equally. The general sense of jus-
tice requires communication with a lawyer and communica-
tion in an open chat to be treated differently. Thus, for consti-
tutional reasons and based on the fundamental right of equal 
treatment, a differentiation of electronic data is an indispen-
sable requirement for any comprehensive legal framework 
tackling the issue. There is currently no structural approach 
of how to differentiate electronic data comprehensively. Only 
regarding communication data different levels of sensitivity 
are assumed, leading to a distinction between content data and 
non-content data (or metadata), while non-content data are 
sometimes further broken down into user data (or subscriber 
data) and traffic data.15
This differentiation is widely acknowledged. It derives from 
the transition of classical telecommunication providers from 
analogue to digital networks in the early 1990s. For billing 
purposes, the companies had to rely on the data provided in 
the service contract, such as the name of the subscriber and 
his/her address, and the monthly bill was invoiced in paper 
form. In addition, the details of the concrete service, such as 
the destination and duration of a call (today’s traffic data), had 
to be documented in order to provide proof in case of disa-
greement about the billing. Lastly, and different than today, 
the content of a communication was of no relevance for the 
involved service provider. Having its origin in the practical 
needs of service providers, the traditional differentiation sub-
sequently found its way into legal frameworks concerning data 
protection and criminal procedural law.
Irrespective of whether it was compliant with legal require-
ments in the past, the traditional differentiation used today is 
no longer suitable anymore with regard to modern communi-
cations. Especially in the context of social media and open chat 
fora, the content of a communication can no longer automati-
cally be assumed more sensitive than non-content data that the 
user does not want to share publicly. In addition, the needs 
of the service providers involved have changed significantly. 
They no longer need to possess the traditional user data, e.g. 
when pre-paid services are offered, and often, parameters like 
the duration of a call via an internet application, such as Skype 
or WhatsApp, are of no relevance for billing. In fact, the user 
increasingly does not have to pay for a service with an amount 
of money based on the amount of service delivered. Instead, 
the user agrees (with more or less awareness) that his/her per-
sonal data will be given in exchange for the service. These 
data might include the content of a communication which is 
of high economic value because it can be sold, analyzed, and 
ultimately used e.g. for tailored advertising. 
To add to the complexity of the problem, the common distinc-
tion of communication data refers to the same wording inter-
nationally; yet, due to the technical expansion of communica-
tion means, the terms are often used with slightly different but 
relevant different meanings.16 Apart from concerns emerging 
from the traditional distinction of communication data, major 
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classification gaps remain regarding all non-communication 
data. This affects not only the machine-to-machine exchange of 
information, which is increasing significantly with the growth of 
the Internet of Things and which covers everything from most 
sensitive to most trivial data and also any data that are not shared 
but only stored on the user’s device or “in the cloud.”
Thus, the traditional model of classifying electronic data has 
served its time. A new approach must be taken.
VI.  Classifying Electronic Data – Current Discussion
The required re-classification of electronic data for criminal pur-
poses should ideally fulfil several conditions in order to allow 
“good” legislation: Firstly, it should aim at covering all potential 
electronic evidence. The classification should be comprehensive 
in order to avoid legislative gaps. Secondly, the classification 
should be technically neutral. Only then can the solution be 
future-proof. That is especially true in the rapidly developing 
cyber area, where specific technical issues may have become 
irrelevant by the time a referring legislation is finally adopted 
and implemented. Ultimately, the classification should follow 
an abstract structure and avoid any catalogue listing. Even if a 
list of detailed types of data seems to facilitate their handling 
at first glance, such a list would be likely to miss one or the 
other type – if not from the outset, then possibly after a short 
time, as no legal amendment procedure can keep up with the 
rapid technical developments in IT. In addition, a catalogue 
listing would likely blur the actual differentiator – if there is 
an appropriate one, it should simply be named.
Taking these premises into account, it needs to be determined 
what exactly constitutes the sensitivity of electronic data. As-
pects which, generally have an impact on the intrusiveness 
of any investigation action – namely whether the measure is 
open or covert, its duration, or the number of people affected 
– should be considered when it comes to the proportionality 
test of the measure. However, they do not play a role for the 
classification as such.
Various approaches are currently discussed about how to de-
termine the sensitivity of electronic data best. The main prob-
lem is the identification of the criteria which determine their 
sensitivity. In short, the following criteria are under discus-
sion, both separately and in combination with one another:
1.  The content of the data
This criterion is reflected in the traditional distinction of com-
munication data, where the content of a set of data refers either 
to the content of the communication itself or to metadata that 
is created through the processing of the data. The flaws of this 
approach are described above. In particular, it can no longer be 
assumed that the content of a publicly shared communication 
is more sensitive per se than, for example, location data that 
the user wishes to hide. It depends on the individual circum-
stances − therefore, referring to the content of a set of data 
is not a suitable criterion for a general classification. In addi-
tion, referral to the content of a set of data would cause practi-
cal problems at the very least when intercepted or retrieved 
stored data are concerned: determining the content would first 
require obtaining and inspecting the data, which might only be 
allowed for certain types of content.
2.  The amount of data collected
This aspect raises not only technical issues: What amount of 
data is considered appropriate for differentiation? How to deal 
with situations where the data to be obtained are unknown in 
advance? It also rules out the premise of technical neutrality 
that the classification should follow. In addition, it cannot be 
assumed that a small amount of data is generally less sensi-
tive than a larger amount. Thus, the amount of data is not an 
appropriate criterion for classification purposes. Nevertheless, 
it is of significant relevance for the proportionality test of any 
concrete measure that is applied.
3.  The technical origin of the data
In order to determine the sensitivity of a set of data, one could 
refer to its technical origin (e.g. an electronic document or a 
digital picture) or the underlying service (e.g. a mobile call, 
a video stream, or a mere storage in the cloud). Besides the 
fact that such an approach would not respect the condition of 
technical neutrality, there is no comprehensible reason why, 
for instance, a document should legally be treated differently 
than a picture. Thus, the technical origin of the data can be 
discarded as a criterion. 
4.  The processing state of the data
It is generally assumed that data in rest are more sensitive 
than data in transit. Although this assumption is not based on 
obvious legal reasons (there are strong arguments in favor of 
the opposite conclusion), there are legal provisions which are 
based on this differentiation and, accordingly, establish differ-
ent investigation measures like real-time communication in-
terception, on the one hand, and the seizure of a data storage 
device, on the other. Like the data volume criterion, the state 
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of the data is not technically neutral. Current problems in this 
context occur concretely regarding cloud storage: from the 
user’s point of view, his/her data are stored and “laid to rest” 
in the cloud while, in fact, the data are frequently processed 
(split, re-merged, duplicated, transferred from one server to 
another one, etc.) for security reasons. In practice, this makes 
it almost impossible to determine the state of a set of data at 
the exact time when an investigation measure is to be applied. 
Furthermore, the applied differentiation is very broad because 
it provides only two groups. That is not sufficient for legal pur-
poses, since there is no doubt that the sensitivity of stored data, 
e.g. on an USB-stick, can vary widely. Thus, referring to the state 
of the data is of little help for the required data classification.
5.  Data protection law approach
Data protection law concerns personal data as opposed to non-
personal data and differentiates further within the first cate-
gory between sensitive and less sensitive data. The top-level 
differentiation between personal and non-personal data obvi-
ously applies to criminal investigation measures as well, as 
there is no need to legislate measures that do not affect a per-
son (or even a large number of persons). However, this broad 
differentiation does not really help. The additional distinction 
division of personal data into sensitive and less sensitive data 
only targets data about a person and does not provide a clas-
sification of data from a person. Furthermore, the relevant cri-
terion derives from the societal mainstream and is therefore 
not necessarily compatible with criminal law aspects.17 Last 
but not least, such a distinction assumes that the content of a 
set of data is known before a measure is taken, which is not 
the case in many investigation measures. For these reasons, 
the approach of data protection law does not support a data 
classification for criminal law purposes.
6.  Significance of the data for the investigation
Focusing on the significance of the data for the concrete inves-
tigation causes an unsolvable problem: in order to determine 
the significance of data, one can refer to the individual case 
or to comparable cases in general. Under the first option, the 
significance could only be determined once the investigation 
has progressed, thus, once the data have been obtained and 
used. At this point in time, the classification would not mat-
ter anymore. Under the second option, the statistical analysis 
would itself rely on a classification (or else the analysis would 
not make any sense), so the question of the appropriate crite-
rion would remain unsolved. In addition to the practical issues, 
the data’s significance for an investigation does not reflect the 
somehow person-related link to the sensitivity of a set of data; 
most useful data can be of marginal sensitivity and vice versa. 
Thus, this criterion should only be considered for the test of 
proportionality and, specifically, of the necessity of a concrete 
measure.
7.  Offense concerned/applicable investigation measure
One could apply a scheme by which the seriousness of the of-
fense concerned or the applicable investigation measure would 
determine the type of data that would be accessible. Thus, the 
more serious the offense or the less intrusive the applicable 
investigation measure (in general terms, i.e. an open measure, 
e.g., would have to be considered less intrusive than a covert 
one), the less strict the conditions and safeguards. However, 
that would not allow an originary classification of data and in-
stead turn the legistic approach upside down: the classification 
is a pre-condition to determining conditions and safeguards 
and not the other way around.
Taking into account the flaws of each of the discussed ap-
proaches, there does not seem to be a feasible solution based 
on a combination of several of the criteria; all of them exhibit 
major problems. Thus, the current discussions do not provide 
a solid solution.
VII.  Classifying Electronic Data – A New Approach
What is instead needed in order to determine the criteria for a 
dataset’s sensitivity, is a new line of thinking that takes into ac-
count the premises mentioned above – being comprehensive, 
technically neutral, and abstract as opposed to detail-listing – 
and focuses on legal aspects, namely on the fundamental rights 
of the data subject.
Looking at other provisions that deal with evidence in criminal 
procedural law, the focus on legal aspects is very common, 
e.g. information that can be obtained through physical inter-
ference or contact with a person. Here, the fundamental right 
of physical integrity is affected and, depending on how much 
it is affected, different investigation measures with different 
safeguards and conditions apply. The extent of physical in-
terference is the key criterion for classifying the body-related 
evidence. It can range from minor (e.g. taking a person’s pic-
ture or fingerprint) to more severe (e.g. taking a blood sample). 
Even beyond that, the grade of intrusiveness provides differ-
ent categories of body-related information such as appearance, 
fingerprint, and blood count. The same applies to documents 
for which legal provisions have established the assumption of 
different levels of sensitivity that are derived from the affected 
fundamental rights.
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In the context of electronic evidence, it is therefore necessary 
in a first step to determine the fundamental rights that are spe-
cifically affected, then to extract their key content, and thirdly 
to filter out the aspect that allows for a differentiation between 
minor and more serious interferences. Once that aspect has 
been carved out, it can be applied.
1.  Relevant fundamental rights
There is a general understanding that the specific fundamen-
tal rights which concern electronic data encompass the right 
of respect for private life, the right of self-determination, and 
the right of secrecy of correspondence. Although the concrete 
interpretations may slightly differ (especially when they refer 
to very similar, yet not identical legal frameworks like the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, or national constitutions), there is still an 
overall agreement that the principles of the above-mentioned 
fundamental rights are the relevant ones.
2.  Key content of the relevant fundamental rights
Concisely, the key content of the relevant fundamental rights 
regarding electronic data is the data subject’s possibility to 
freely and independently decide what happens to his/her 
data – who should have access to them, with whom they are 
shared, etc. Electronic data might, for example, not be shared 
at all, be shared only with most trusted persons, or be shared 
publicly with an uncontrolled number of persons. Thus, the 
core issue of data-related fundamental rights relates to the 
confidentiality of the data.
3.  Key criterion for differentiating the grade  
of interference
The grade of interference with the confidentiality of data 
depends on how much the free will of the data subject is re-
spected: the more it is respected, the less interference. In other 
words, the more the data subject can reasonably expect that a 
set of data will remain confident, the more sensitive the data 
are. It needs to be stressed that, because of its derivation from 
individual fundamental rights, the sensitivity of electronic data 
depends only on the data subject; there is no room for allowing 
e.g. the legislator or society to decide what is sensitive for a 
specific individual.
These findings allow the following conclusions: First, whether a 
set of data is sensitive or not does not depend on the status of the 
data subject in the investigation; it is the same for the suspect, the 
victim, and the witness alike. Thus, the role of the data subject in 
the investigation is irrelevant for the classification of electronic 
data; it only requires consideration when it comes to the propor-
tionality test of a concrete investigation measure. 
Second, the coincidental processing state of the data (whether 
it is currently being processed or not) does not matter for the 
classification of electronic data. The sensitivity, e.g. of the 
content of an electronic diary, does not depend on whether it is 
still on the laptop at home, in the process of being transmitted 
to the storage place in the cloud, or already stored there.
Third, the level of confidentiality that can be reasonably ex-
pected depends on the circumstances of the specific case. 
There are two crucial aspects for its determination: the data 
subject’s behavior (i.e. to what extent he/she shares the respec-
tive data) and his/her bond of trust with the person who re-
ceives the data. This bond of trust can be based on both actual 
and/or legal grounds, e.g. on the personal relationship between 
close friends or on a contractual agreement with a service pro-
vider. On the contrary, the content of the information does not 
play a key role for the confidentiality assessment; it may be an 
indicator, but nothing more.
VIII.  Applying the New Criterion of Reasonable  
Expectation of Confidentiality
The finding that the classification of electronic data has to rely 
only on the criterion of the data subject’s reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality allows classifications of different granu-
larities. In order to find a workable balance between the wide 
range of potential data sensitivity and the number of data cat-
egories, a classification with five categories is proposed. These 
are, in order of decreasing sensitivity: (1) data of core signifi-
cance for private life, (2) secret data, (3) shared confidential 
data, (4) data of limited accessibility, and (5) data of unlimited 
accessibility.
1.  Data of core significance for private life
The first category − the data of core significance for private 
life − refers to the most private, inviolable data; the reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality extends to the level of knowl-
edge that the information will not be used as evidence in a 
criminal investigation.
2.  Secret data
The category of secret data refers to additional electronic in-
formation that the data subject has not shared with anyone else 
or, alternatively, to data that have been transferred to a reli-
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able, usually non-natural third party with the only intention 
that this party stores the data without gaining knowledge of 
its actual content, e.g. where a provider offers the automated 
service of cloud storage without any additional services. In 
both cases, the reasonable expectation of confidentiality is 
very high.
3.  Shared confidential data
Shared confidential data has been shared with specifically 
trusted persons under the data subject’s reasonable expecta-
tion that the information will not be distributed any further, 
e.g. with a spouse, a very close friend, a lawyer or a doctor. 
Compared to secret data, however, there is an increased risk 
that the information will be leaked.
4.  Data of limited accessibility
Data of limited accessibility is data that have been shared 
with one or a limited number of individuals who are not spe-
cifically trusted. This category takes into account that a con-
trolled distribution of the data still indicates a certain will to 
maintain at least some confidentiality, while at the same time 
acknowledging that the reasonable expectation that the data 
will not be shared further is rather limited. It covers all com-
munication metadata in the sense of the traditional classifica-
tion, because the use of electronic means for communication 
inevitably depends on information like the recipient’s contact 
data or the radio cell used. This information is available to 
the involved service provider(s) who generally cannot claim 
specific personal trustworthiness.
5.  Data of unlimited accessibility
For information distributed publicly – or data of unlimited 
accessibility (e.g. on an open social media platform) −, there 
is no reasonable expectation of confidentiality. The same 
applies to data voluntarily shared with law enforcement 
authorities with the knowledge that the information might 
serve as evidence in a criminal investigation. Furthermore, 
it covers data that voluntarily and legally disclosed to law 
enforcement by a third party, at least if the third party has 
obtained the data in a legal way. The reason for including 
the last-mentioned alternative is the consideration that the 
confidentiality was breached through the act of a third party 
without pro-active support from any authority, and the ma-
terialized risk of voluntary disclosure by the informed third 
party is fully on the data subject`s side.
IX.  Résumé
The newly introduced approach allows a comprehensive data 
classification for criminal law purposes, which is urgently 
needed. It avoids the problem of defining communication data 
and closes current gaps.18 The comprehensive classification 
facilitates an all-encompassing regulation that embraces all 
criminal investigation measures related to electronic data.19 
Since it is solely based on the affected fundamental rights of 
the data subject and not dependent on, e.g. billing purposes 
of telecommunication service providers in the past, it is sol-
idly based for legal purposes. For the same reason, the new 
classification of electronic data is also coherent with the ex-
isting classifications of other types of criminal evidence, e.g. 
documents or body-related information, both of which are also 
categorized according to the level of interference with the af-
fected fundamental rights.
In addition, because of its technical neutrality, the new model 
is decoupled from future technical developments; it is future-
proof. Furthermore, the questionable legislative differentiation 
between telecommunication service providers and over-the-
top service providers becomes obsolete; when offering ser-
vices that are identical from the user’s perspective, they have 
to be treated equally.
The referral to abstract terms for the different categories avoids 
the flaws inherent to a detail-listing catalogue. One can assume 
that, with the knowledge of its legistic derivation, the courts 
would substantiate the various categories – as it has happened 
in the context of other abstract terms in criminal law.
X.  Outlook
This article focuses on criminal law, yet its derivation from 
the affected fundamental rights might allow further potential 
applications, e.g. regarding data retention or civil law. In prac-
tice, the approach can be directly applied where existing legal 
provisions do not address the issue of the required level of 
proof concerning the integrity and authenticity of electronic 
data that are to serve as evidence. The lower the level of sen-
sitivity, the more easily a court could, in general, assume the 
integrity and authenticity of the data. In other words, the more 
confidential the data, the higher the required level of proof of 
their integrity and authenticity. Furthermore, until a compre-
hensive legal framework enters into force, the new model can 
serve the test of proportionality for any investigative measure 
that refers to electronic data.
Due to the comparable protection of fundamental rights in 
the “Western” world and specifically the European Union, 
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the model could subsequently be applied in these countries 
as well. This would significantly improve the more and more 
frequently required international cooperation regarding the 
acquisition and exchange of electronic data as well as their 
admissibility in court.
While the new classification provides solutions, new questions 
also emerge. As mentioned earlier, the courts would have to 
substantiate some abstract legal terms, such as the “reasonable 
expectation” of confidentiality. However, this would only be 
a matter of time and is no issue of principle concern. Within 
the context of determining the reasonable expectation of con-
fidentiality, the use of encryption could be considered an ad-
ditional indicator, possibly depending on whether it is applied 
intentionally or by default through the service provider. Fur-
ther issues arise in cases in which the data subject’s behavior 
does not correspond to his/her expectation of confidentiality, 
e.g. where data are shared unknowingly or where a third party 
distributes the information without being allowed to do so.
Finally, it has to be clarified who the data subject is, e.g. in 
cases of machine-to-machine communication (any non-public 
information exchange eventually refers to at least one person), 
or when the data relate to a group of natural persons or a legal 
person.
These questions are not exclusive. Finding appropriate solu-
tions requires a rethinking of how to approach potential elec-
tronic evidence. This article is meant as a first impulse to start 
the discussion.
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The dissertation will be published in 2019.
2 The term „legistics“ refers to the sum of all aspects that have to be 
considered by any law maker in order to create „good“ laws – such as 
the principles of necessity and proportionality. It seems that the seldomly 
used term has been introduced by U. Karpen, Gesetzgebungslehre – neu 
evaluiert – Legistics – freshly evaluated, Baden-Baden 2008. Accordingly, 
references are made to „legistic requirements“ in this article, meaning 
those that should ideally be considered in any law making process.
3 See, e.g., Art. 2(b) of the Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against 
information systems (O.J. L 218, 14.8.2013, 8) and Art. 1(b) of the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185).
4 Traditional evidence includes persons (witnesses and experts) and 
physical things (objects for legal inspection such as documents, pictures, 
or real estate).
5 E.g., the use of proxy servers can hide concrete data transfers while user 
names, e-mail addresses, and other identifiers do not have to reveal any 
information about the persons behind them. Another major challenge for 
law enforcement in this context is the simultaneous distribution of identical 
dynamic IP addresses to up to several thousand users at one time.
6 Strafprozessordnung, StPO.
7 In most countries, the term “telecommunication service provider” re-
fers to the traditional provider who is usually legally obliged to cooperate 
with law enforcement, whereas the new over-the-top service providers 
generally do not have to disclose available electronic data. This distinction 
is made even where identical data is available (e.g., when it comes to the 
IP address used for a concrete communication) or where, from the user’s 
point of view, identical services are delivered (e.g., a mobile phone call 
without an additional user’s application or via WhatsApp for instance). In 
Germany, the differentiating definitions of the respective service provid-
ers are found in the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) and the Telemedi-
engesetz (TMG).
8 This was one of the main legal questions in the YAHOO! Inc. v Belgium 
case (Hof van Cassatie of Belgium, 1 December 2015, case P.13.2082.N).
9 That was the key question in the so-called Microsoft Ireland case 
(Supreme Court of the United States, No. 17-2, 584 U.S. (2018)) in the USA, 
which was rendered moot by the US Supreme Court after the Clarifying 
Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act; H.R. 4943) was enacted in 
March 2018.
10 E.g., in May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack hit more than 
300,000 computers across more than 150 countries within hours.
11 For more detailed information about „loss of location“ and „loss of 
knowledge of location“ see, e.g., B-J. Koops and M. Goodwin, Cyber-
space, the Cloud, and Cross-border Criminal Investigation. The Limits and 
Possibilities of International Law, 2014; A.-M. Osula, “Accessing Extrater-
ritorially Located Data: Options for States”, in: M. N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, U. 
Sieber, “Straftaten und Strafverfolgung im Internet“, Gutachten C zum 
69. Deutschen Juristentag, 2012, C 77 and C 143; C. Warken, “Elektro-
nische Beweismittel im Strafprozessrecht – eine Momentaufnahme 
über den deutschen Tellerrand hinaus, Teil I“, (2017) Neue Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschafts-, Steuer- und Unternehmensstrafrecht (NZWiSt), 289, 295; 
M. Zoetekouw, “Ignorantia Terrae Non Excusat“, Discussion Paper for the 
Crossing Borders: Jusrisdiction in Cyberspace conference – March 2016.
12 Existing general instruments are the European Investigation Order 
(Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters, O.J. L 130, 1.5.2014, 1) and the European Freezing Order 
(Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA on the execution in the European 
Union of orders freezing property or evidence, O.J. L 196, 2.8.2003, 45).
13 The European Commission’s e-evidence proposal of April 2018 
(“Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence 
in criminal matters”, COM(2018) 225 final − 2018/0108 (COD)) includes, 
e.g., “quick freeze” provisions and data disclosure obligations specifically 
designed for electronic data that would apply to any provider offering 
services in the EU, irrespective of the location of its headquarters or of the 
location of data storage.
14 In modern “Western” constitutions, e.g., the gender of a person, his/
her religion, or his/her origin are inapplicable differentiators.
Claudia Warken
Judge at the Regional Court (Landgericht) Ulm, 
Germany;  
Seconded National Expert to the European 
Commission (March 2016 – September 2018)
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
234 |  eucrim   4 / 2018
15 The term „communication data“ is not legally defined. Thus, it remains 
unclear what exactly is covered.
16 E.g., machine-to-machine data exchange is not always considered 
communication data; information about the user’s bank account is only 
sometimes covered by subscriber data; an IP address might be subscriber 
data or traffic data.
17 Data protection law considers, e.g., genetic and biometric data to be 
equally sensitive. In criminal procedural law, however, the use of genetic 
data, such as information about a genetic disorder, is much more limited 
The European Commission’s Proposal for  
a Regulation on Preventing the Dissemination  
of Terrorist Content Online
Dr. Gavin Robinson
In September 2018, the European Commission presented a draft Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content 
online. The proposal builds on EU-level initiatives to foster the voluntary cooperation of service providers in stopping the dis-
semination of terrorist content online, and it echoes ongoing national developments which go a step further in imposing ob-
ligations – underpinned by considerable fines – on service providers. This article describes the main features of the proposal 
and highlights some of the policy challenges, legal questions, and technological concerns it is likely to face on the road to 
adoption.
than the use of biometric data, such as a fingerprint.
18 The doctoral thesis includes a table comparing different datasets 
and their categorizations in the traditional system (if any) with the newly 
proposed one; it also shows the practical and structural advantages of the 
new classification.
19 The doctoral thesis includes a concrete, comprehensive, and com-
mented draft of how electronic data could be dealt with in the German 
Code of Criminal Procedure.
I.  Introduction
At the informal European Council summit in Salzburg on 
19th and 20th September 2018, the European Commission pre-
sented a draft Regulation on preventing the dissemination of 
terrorist content online.1 The proposal builds upon EU-level 
initiatives to foster the voluntary cooperation of service pro-
viders in stopping the dissemination of terrorist content online, 
chiefly the cross-sectoral EU Internet Forum and the work of 
Europol’s Internet Referral Unit (IRU). It also echoes ongo-
ing national developments which go a step further in imposing 
obligations – underpinned by considerable fines – on service 
providers to hastily remove illegal content and prevent re-
uploading, such as the German Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 
(NetzDG), passed in June 2017. The Regulation would apply 
to “hosting service providers” (HSPs), defined as “a provider 
of information society services consisting in the storage of in-
formation provided by and at the request of the content pro-
vider and in making the information stored available to third 
parties” (Art. 2(1)).2 Another prerequisite is that HSPs offer 
services in the Union, irrespective of their place of main estab-
lishment (Art. 1(2)). 
The draft Regulation, which is strongly supported by both 
France and Germany, takes a four-pronged approach to terror-
ist content online:
 At the “light touch” end of the regulatory spectrum it seeks 
to establish EU-wide general duties of care on HSPs to take 
“appropriate, reasonable and proportionate actions […] 
against the dissemination of terrorist content and to protect 
users from terrorist content” (Art. 3);
 It would enshrine a framework of practical arrangements for 
HSPs’ own assessment of terrorist content once “referred” 
to them by national competent authorities or the relevant 
Union body (Europol) (Art. 5), discussed below under II.;
 It introduces removal orders, to be issued by national com-
petent authorities, which must be complied with within one 
hour (Art. 4). This is the proposal’s flagship measure, and is 
discussed below under III. In addition to the tight deadline, 
the removal order comes with the most bite of the measures 
eucrim   4 / 2018  | 235
PREVENTING THE DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST CONTENT ONLINE
the more regrettable since HSPs “shall, as a matter of priority, 
assess the content […]” (Art. 5(5)), meaning that HSPs’ con-
sideration of putative referred terrorist content is actually not 
voluntary but mandatory, with sanctions hovering over them 
in case of poor performance.
In assessing referrals from national competent authorities or 
from Europol, HSPs will have to grapple with the Regulation’s 
definitions of terrorist content. According to Art. 2(5) of the 
draft Regulation, “terrorist content” means one or more of the 
following information:
(a) inciting or advocating, including by glorifying, the commission 
of terrorist offences, thereby causing a danger that such acts be 
committed;
(b) encouraging the contribution to terrorist offences;
(c) promoting the activities of a terrorist group, in particular by 
encouraging the participation in or support to a terrorist group 
within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Directive (EU) 2017/541;
(d) instructing on methods or techniques for the purpose of commit-
ting terrorist offences.
The Commission presents the inclusion of the last three cat-
egories, which are broader than the corresponding provisions 
in the 2017 Directive on combating terrorism,7 as a step to 
provide clarity to HSPs and competent authorities and as a 
basis for more effective preventative action,8 given the vari-
able nature of content used for radicalisation purposes. In this 
context, the Commission refers to real-life cases:9 (1) a Danish 
schoolgirl found guilty in 2017 of attempted terrorism having 
tried to make bombs to be used in attacks against her former 
school (radicalised via internet and chat contacts within a few 
months); (2) Daesh’s tactics to “groom” young children (using 
cartoons); and (3) the attack on the Thalys train in 2015 that 
was provoked in the preceding moments by a “call to arms” 
on a YouTube audio file. Yet the examples of terrorist content 
cited all ostensibly feature an element that was not taken up by 
the definition in the draft Regulation: intent. This has raised 
concerns that any communication of terrorist-related content 
will be automatically deleted, irrespective of the context of 
its use (i.e. for confrontation, reporting, research or historical 
purposes).10 Without offering an explicit justification, the draft 
not only “draws on” (cf. recital 9), but also goes beyond the 
wording of the takedown obligation in the Directive on com-
bating terrorism.11
With that said, the converse would have seen HSPs tasked 
with assessing the intentions of content providers, thereby 
adding a further level of complexity to their task of identi-
fying the content per se as terrorist, meaning inter alia “the 
nature and wording of the statements, the context in which the 
statements were made and their potential to lead to harmful 
consequences, thereby affecting the security and safety of per-
sons”.12 Faced with this heavy responsibility, HSPs as well as 
competent authorities are suitably reminded of the importance 
foreseen in the draft Regulation: whilst HSPs in breach of 
the quasi-totality of the obligations anchored in the draft 
Regulation risk incurring penalties, a “systematic failure to 
comply” with removal orders specifically shall be subject 
to financial penalties of up to 4% of the HSP’s latest yearly 
global turnover (Art. 18(4));
 It seeks to erect a compliance framework aiming to ensure 
that HSPs develop and take proactive measures, “including 
by using automated tools”, in order to protect their services 
against the dissemination of terrorist content (Art. 6). The 
development and use of proactive measures, discussed be-
low under IV., are subject to rather terse obligations relating 
to transparency (Art. 8) and safeguards (Art. 9).
II.  Referrals
The inclusion of a referral mechanism in the draft Regulation 
reflects increasingly intensive co-regulatory efforts undertak-
en by EU, national and industry actors in recent years. Most 
notably, 2015 saw two key developments: 
 First, the European Commission launched the EU Internet 
Forum to bring together the internet industry and Member 
States, as well as Europol, the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network and the European Strategic Communications Net-
work in order to tackle the spread of terrorist content online; 
 Second, Europol itself established internally the so-called 
EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) to actively scan the inter-
net for terrorist content and refer it to host platforms. The 
Commission reports that “over 50,000 decisions for refer-
rals across over 80 platforms in more than 10 languages 
have been made since 2015”, whilst five Member States 
have since set up their own IRUs.3
Notwithstanding this increased voluntary activity, the Com-
mission now posits that “referrals alone will not be able to 
achieve the necessary impact – particularly with regards [sic] 
to volume and speed of response”,4 necessitating also the in-
troduction of removal orders and the development of proac-
tive measures, discussed below under III. and IV. As such, 
the principal attraction of formalising the referral mechanism 
in a Regulation is represented by the attendant fines which it 
would require;5 the firm application of as-yet-undefined pen-
alties is envisaged specifically in relation to HSPs’ “assess-
ment of and feedback on referrals” (Art. 18(1)(c)). Although 
referrals are to be assessed not against provisions in EU or 
national law but against service providers’ own terms and con-
ditions (Art. 5(5)),6 and as a rule the idea remains that it is 
HSPs which shall decide whether or not to take action, the 
pressure which HSPs are likely to come under from competent 
authorities sits uneasily with the term “voluntary considera-
tion” (Art. 5(2) and Art. 2(8)). The choice of wording is all 
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of freedom of expression and information, “one of the values 
on which the Union is founded”.13 Digital rights campaigners, 
however, are unlikely to be reassured by much of the support-
ing argumentation put forward by the Commission. 
In explaining its decision to broaden the definition of terrorist 
content to include recruitment and training for terrorism, the 
Commission draws attention to safeguards including (domes-
tic) “judicial reviews of removal orders and the possibility to 
issue a counter-notice, as well as measures taken to mitigate 
the possibility of erroneous removals when deploying proac-
tive measures”.14 Yet as regards referrals, which are non-bind-
ing, available redress is in fact limited to (private) complaint 
mechanisms (Art. 10). Moreover, the fact that HSPs’ assess-
ments are to be facilitated by the prior appraisal of Europol 
and national authorities (which may be of a judicial, adminis-
trative, or most pertinently law enforcement nature) “with par-
ticular expertise to identify whether or not the content could 
potentially constitute terrorist content as defined by law” is 
proffered as a “safeguard” against erroneous removals.15 This 
reasoning seems to presuppose – and depend on – high levels 
of trust in the competent authorities.
III.  Removal Orders
Under the proposal, national competent authorities may also 
issue removal orders to HSPs. Member States are free to as-
sign this task to either administrative, law enforcement or 
judicial authorities.16 In contrast to referrals (see II.), HSPs 
must comply with removal orders within one hour of recep-
tion (Art. 4(2)). Thus, the provider can only decide whether 
to remove the relevant content or to block access thereto.17 
Removal orders sent to HSPs shall contain, inter alia, a state-
ment of reasons explaining why the content is considered ter-
rorist content by reference to the definitions used in the draft 
Regulation, information enabling the identification of the con-
tent referred (typically a URL), and information about redress 
available to both the HSP and to the content provider.
From the content providers’ perspective, the draft Regulation 
provides that HSPs are in turn to supply them with “informa-
tion” regarding the removal or blocking of content (Art. 11(1)) 
and (upon request of the content provider) reasons for such 
action (Art. 11(2)). However, these obligations may be sus-
pended for up to four weeks where the competent authority 
decides for reasons of public security, such as the preven-
tion, investigation, detection and prosecution of terrorist of-
fences, that no information on removal or blocking should 
be disclosed. Although the instrument would require HSPs to 
establish (private) mechanisms allowing content providers to 
complain and request the reinstatement of content removed 
or blocked pursuant to a referral or via proactive measures 
(Art. 10), this – understandably – does not apply to content 
removed or blocked by HSPs pursuant to a non-negotiable 
one-hour removal order.
Rapidity is the order of the day not only as regards HSPs’ re-
sponses to removal orders; it also characterises the recent pol-
icy-making flurry at EU level. The proposal for a Regulation 
comes hot on the heels of the Commission’s March 2018 Rec-
ommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content 
online. It encouraged Member States to develop their response 
to all types of illegal content, inter alia, through systems of no-
tices to HSPs, informing content providers and counter-notic-
es, transparency and safeguards, and the cooperation of HSPs 
with national competent authorities, with “trusted flaggers”, 
and amongst themselves.18 Indeed, most of the core provisions 
of the draft Regulation have been fleshed out from the Com-
mission’s earlier specific recommendations relating to terrorist 
content, which featured inter alia a ban on terrorist content in 
HSPs’ terms of service, referrals, proactive measures, coop-
eration and the one-hour rule:19 
Hosting service providers should assess and, where appropriate, re-
move or disable access to content identified in referrals, as a general 
rule, within one hour from the moment at which they received the 
referral.
Should the draft Regulation enshrine the one-hour rule in EU 
law, this will represent a real change of gear compared to the 
existing general, open-ended obligation on Member States to 
“take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal 
of online content constituting a public provocation to commit 
a terrorist offence” (Art. 21 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 on 
combating terrorism). The deadline for implementation of the 
Directive passed on 8 September 2018 – less than a fortnight 
before the draft terrorist content Regulation was unveiled – 
with the Commission stating that 15 Member States had noti-
fied it of measures giving effect to their Art. 21 obligation in 
their domestic systems.20 Arguably, an evaluation of national 
measures taken pursuant to Art. 21 would be essential to gaug-
ing the added value of the Directive, as well as “its impact 
on fundamental rights and freedoms, including on non-dis-
crimination” (Article 29, Directive on combating terrorism). 
The distant deadline for the Commission’s added value report, 
however, is 8 September 2021.
In opting to respond to Member State pressure with a pro-
posal for a Regulation21 before any such evaluation of the 
Terrorism Directive has occurred, the Commission may also 
have been swayed by its experience of chasing up the slow 
and patchy implementation of Art. 25 of Directive 2011/92/
EU. This provision stipulates that Member States shall on the 
one hand take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt 
removal of, and may on the other hand take measures to 
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block access to, web pages containing or disseminating child 
pornography.22 
The draft Regulation covers the main practical matters on the 
procedure for removal/blocking orders, e.g. nomination of 
HSP points of contact or legal representatives, framework for 
interaction between HSPs and competent authorities, provi-
sions on language etc., but, as noted above, controversially23 
leaves open a key aspect to the Member States: the choice 
of competent authority. The Commission itself notes that in 
the majority of national systems a takedown order may come 
only from a judicial body within criminal proceedings. Some 
Member States, however, provide for administrative orders – 
subject to appeal before a court – and in a few Member States 
even law enforcement authorities can issue removal orders and 
refer content to service providers.24 
This flexibility stands in contrast to the one-hour rule, which 
applies only to removal orders, is far tighter than existing 
provisions in national law mandating, for instance, removal 
within 24 or 48 hours,25 and is justified by the Commission 
by reference to the speed at which terrorist content is claimed 
to spread across online services.26 The preference for such a 
short window for removal or blocking goes hand-in-hand with 
the Commission’s choice to eschew an “all illegal content” ap-
proach – deemed “unnecessary and disproportionate”27 – and 
focus instead on terrorist content as a priority, at least for now. 
The immediate imperative to act at national level is of course 
constituted by the increasing use of HSPs to disseminate ter-
rorist content. The main driver for EU action on an Art. 114 
TFEU legal basis, meanwhile, is the hindrance to the effective 
exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services across the Union which may result from the legal un-
certainty caused by a deepening “fragmentation” of national 
responses to the removal or disabling of access to illegal con-
tent in general (as already envisaged in the e-commerce Direc-
tive)28 and terrorist content in particular (as recently mandated 
by the Terrorism Directive). Here too, there is fertile ground 
for debate over the coming months as to the true necessity 
of EU action – and not only from a freedom of expression 
perspective. Notably, whereas one might expect the anchoring 
of such a forceful rule as the one-hour window in a Regula-
tion to receive solid backing from law enforcement circles, 
national law enforcement authorities are in fact cited by the 
Commission as favouring the continuation of self-regulatory 
initiatives, “allowing industry to take the lead … whilst work-
ing closely with them”.29 
On the HSP side, the Commission also cites input from “com-
panies” to the effect that diverging legislation is a serious con-
cern and smaller companies are likely to suffer the most from 
28 different sets of rules.30 This position calls for two remarks. 
First, although it seems undeniable that the functioning of the 
“country of origin” principle would likely be undermined by 
the continued proliferation of national removal order systems 
with differing assessments of terrorist content (e.g. compli-
ance with regulatory requirements in one Member State en-
suring access to all others, only for one or several of those 
other Member States to remove or block access to content), 
the added value of the draft Regulation in this specific respect 
would seem to depend on levels of cohesiveness between 
competent authorities which are high enough to produce simi-
larity between the decisions they take.31 This may raise work-
ability concerns, particularly given the likely varying nature 
of competent authorities and the open-ended definition of ter-
rorist content they are to be mandated to apply. Second, with 
regard to impact on smaller HSPs, achieving readiness to re-
spond to one-hour takedown orders could indeed affect small 
companies even more compared to the status quo – although 
this is, in principle, to be factored into sanctioning decisions.32 
In these respects, we can expect industry to call for further 
clarification and substantiation in the near future.
IV.  Proactive Measures 
Perhaps the most novel section of the draft Regulation entails 
a duty on HSPs to take proactive measures to protect their ser-
vices against the dissemination of terrorist content (Art. 6). 
HSPs are to report to the competent authority33 on “the specific 
proactive measures […] taken, including by using automated 
tools, with a view to: 
 preventing the re-upload of content which has previously 
been removed or to which access has been disabled because 
it is considered to be terrorist content; 
 detecting, identifying and expeditiously removing or disa-
bling access to terrorist content”.34 
Should the competent authority deem such measures to be in-
sufficient, the HSP is bound to cooperate with it in order to 
establish “key objectives and benchmarks as well as timelines 
for their implementation” (Art. 6(3)). Where no agreement can 
be reached, the taking of specific proactive measures can be 
imposed on HSPs by the competent authority (Art. 6(4)). Pen-
alties for HSPs which fail to report on proactive measures, or 
to adopt such measures following a decision imposing them, 
are to be set out at national level (Art. 18(1)(d)).
This mini-compliance framework for the automated detection 
and removal of terrorist content channels a fairly recent but 
major growth in political pressure35 as well as industry activ-
ity, chiefly in the form of a pooled ”hash database”.36 The ex-
tent to which such initiatives and the technologies they employ 
are truly effective at accurately identifying terrorist content (as 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
238 |  eucrim   4 / 2018
distinct from removing vast swathes of content)37 raises a set 
of thorny issues which are likely to play out in the months to 
come, particularly given the European Parliament’s position 
on the importance of transparency in the use of algorithms. In 
this context, the EP recently called on the Commission and the 
Member States to “examine the potential for error and bias in 
the use of algorithms in order to prevent any kind of discrimi-
nation, unfair practice or breach of privacy”.38 
Counterbalancing its provisions designed to foster the uptake 
of proactive measures, the draft Regulation stipulates standard 
GDPR-era obligations on HSPs. These include the provision 
of a meaningful explanation of such tools in their terms and 
conditions, the publication of transparency reports (including 
“information” and absolute figures on action taken and com-
plaint procedures) and the provision of safeguards to ensure 
that decisions taken concerning stored content are “accurate 
and well-founded”. Safeguards shall consist, in particular, of 
“human oversight and verifications where appropriate and, in 
any event, where a detailed assessment of the relevant context 
is required in order to determine whether or not the content is 
to be considered terrorist content” (Art. 9). Beyond the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s calls for caution, it is worth noting the 
concerns voiced by David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, a few weeks before publication of the 
draft Regulation. In his report, Kaye makes specific reference 
to the application of artificial intelligence (AI) tools to online 
content and states:39 
Even when algorithmic content moderation is complemented by 
human review – an arrangement that large social media platforms 
argue is increasingly infeasible on the scale at which they operate 
– a tendency to defer to machine-made decisions (…) impedes in-
terrogation of content moderation outcomes, especially when the 
system’s technical design occludes that kind of transparency.
The Commission considered several options with regard to the 
use of automated tools: deferring to companies’ own risk as-
sessment; mandatory uptake of measures limited to the preven-
tion of re-uploading of known terrorist content; and mandatory 
uptake of “appropriate proactive measures, including by using 
automated detection tools”.40 Despite the above-mentioned 
misgivings, which can also be found amongst EU Member 
State governments,41 the Commission has chosen the most far-
reaching option. It does so whilst acknowledging42 that should 
proactive measures inadequately distinguish between unlaw-
ful and lawful conduct, this may risk undermining, inter alia, 
freedom of information in contravention of settled EU law.43 
This tense relationship with standing CJEU case law barring 
the imposition of systematic ISP (internet service provider) fil-
tering for copyright breaches is also reflected in the wording of 
recital 16 to the draft Regulation. That recital states that whilst 
on the one hand it is up to HSPs to determine what proactive 
measure should be put in place, on the other hand “(t)his re-
quirement should not imply a general monitoring obligation”. 
Should the co-legislators concur with those judges who have 
remarked that the use of automated processes is “pushing in 
the direction” of a general monitoring obligation,44 we may yet 
see a return in the final text to one of the more limited policy 
options evoked in the Commission’s Impact Assessment.
Lastly, a less immediately obvious legal tangle may await the 
proposal in general, and its drive toward proactive measures 
in particular. Art. 7 of the draft Regulation obliges HSPs to 
preserve terrorist content which has been removed or disabled 
as a result of a removal order, a referral or proactive measures. 
With a preservation period set at six months (extendable), the 
potential ramifications of this framework are bound to attract 
comparisons to the (annulled) Data Retention Directive – es-
pecially insofar as the obligation not only covers the targeted 
terrorist content per se but also extends to “related data re-
moved as a consequence of the removal of the terrorist con-
tent” (Art. 7(2)). 
The term “related data” is not defined in the main text of the 
draft Regulation, but subscriber data and access data are giv-
en as examples in recital 20. This is unlikely to quell fears 
of over-preservation by HSPs and will likely fuel calls for a 
more precise wording. Moreover, whatever data is preserved 
by HSPs as being in their estimation “likely to have a link with 
terrorist offences” (recital 21) may be used for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
(Art. 7(1)(b)). Depending on definitions in place in national 
systems, these purposes may open broad channels of access 
to large amounts of data generated by the customers of HSPs. 
In turn, this approach triggers concerns regarding profiling, 
particularly in light of the CJEU’s language on the use of non-
content data to draw “very precise conclusions concerning the 
private lives of the persons whose data has been retained”45 
and lead to “the feeling that (users’) private lives are the sub-
ject of constant surveillance”.46 
V.  Outlook 
For the reasons evoked in this overview, the strong political 
support for swift regulatory action on terrorist content online, 
which is reflected in the Commission’s draft Regulation, is 
sure to be tested as the proposal progresses through the EU’s 
legislative procedure – in particular by pressure from the Inter-
net industry and digital rights groups. 
Taken as a whole, the proposal envisages the transformation 
of extant co-regulation and voluntary self-policing by hosting 
service providers (HSPs) into a framework of obligations (to 
respond to referrals; to comply with removal orders; to imple-
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ment proactive measures) bolstered by sit-up-and-take-notice 
sanctions. To deliver on this vision, the dossier will have to 
navigate doubts as to the necessity of taking such action at EU 
level. This may be accompanied by principled objections on 
grounds of freedom of expression. The initiative will also en-
counter narrower concerns over its potential impact on smaller 
HSPs and over key matters of scope and legal certainty – right 
down to the broadly termed definition of “terrorist content” 
provided therein. 
With the EU Council having agreed its negotiating position 
on the proposal in early December 2018,47 the ball is now 
squarely in the European Parliament’s court. Given that the 
next elections to the Parliament are scheduled for late May 
2019, we can expect the Committee on Civil Liberties, Jus-
tice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) to finalise its re-
port on the proposal before then. We may have to wait until 
the fourth quarter of 2019, however, to see interinstitutional 
talks begin.
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